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Happy Birthday, Harter: A Reappraisal of the
Harter Act on its 1 00th Anniversary
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY*
I.
INTRODUCTION
One hundred years ago, the United States Congress broke with
existing legal theory by forbidding carrier exculpatory clauses,
thereby intervening in the contractual relations between cargo-
owning interests and ship-owning interests. The 1893 Harter Act,'
applicable to domestic as well as international ocean voyages, has
never been repealed or even amended. It was virtually displaced as to
ocean shipments by the 1936 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
("COGSA"),2 a statute that also specifically preserved it, 3 and the
relationship between the Harter Act and COGSA remains a puzzle for
both the courts and the bar. The Harter Act has been called one of the
first consumer protection acts. 4 The question for 1993 is whether it is
time to repeal it.
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, New York City. Member, Editorial
Board, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce.
'Act of Feb. 13, 1893, ch. 105, §§ 81-196; 27 Stat. 445-46, codified as 46 U.S.C. Appx. §§
190-96 (1988).
246 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 1300-15 (1988).31d. at § 1311 provides that:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as superseding any part of sections 190-196 of
this title, or of any other law which would be applicable in the absence of this chapter,
insofar as they relate to the duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of the ship or carrier
prior to the time when the goods are loaded on or after the time they are discharged from
the ship.
See further infra notes 174-79.
4W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 573 (3d ed. 1988).
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II.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Legislative Provisions
Today, the Harter Act would not be considered well drafted
because it has a major inconsistency. 5 It is not a code governing
shipping problems. 6 However, it is free of the policy-based definitions
that plague other statutes and it succinctly deals with a few vital
problems of interest to the international trading community. Unfor-
tunately, the premise on which it is built is the carrier's issuance of a
paper bill of lading, a circumstance that makes it unsuitable for
electronic data information exchange in the same way that COGSA is
unsuitable for modern business. 7
Section One8 of the Harter Act forbids bill of lading clauses that
relieve the carrier from negligence liability in the "proper loading,
5Sections One and Two apply to bills of lading "from" the United States, while Section
Three applies to bills of lading "to or from" the United States.6Modern transport conventions customarily begin with definitions of terms, geographic
scope of application, documentary scope, period of responsibility, basis of carrier liability,
limits of carrier liability, loss of right to limit liability, liability of the shipper, documentary
contents, notice of loss, time bar, and jurisdiction of courts. See, e.g., The Hamburg Rules,
1978 United Nations Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 17 Int'l Legal Materials 608
(1978), 6 Benedict on Admiralty Doc. No. 1-3 (7th ed. 1992), as well as the 1980 Multimodal
Convention, UN Doc. TD/MT/CONF/16 (not in force). See Driscoll & Larsen, The Convention
on the International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 193 (1982), and the 1991
Convention on the Liability of Terminal Operators in International Trade, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 152/13. See Sweeney, New U.N. Convention on Liability of Terminal Operators in
International Trade, 14 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1115 (1991).
Missing from the Harter Act are policy-based "definitions" as well as provisions on the
documentary scope (whether charter parties in private carriage as well as bills of lading in
common carriage are covered); time bar (whether the doctrine of laches or some statute of
limitations applies); notice of loss; unit limitation of liability (such as the provision in COGSA
for limitation of the carrier's liability at $500 per package, 46 U.S.C. Appx. § 1304(a)(5) (1988));
basis of liability (plaintiff's burden of proof of fault or defendant's burden of proof of non-fault);
and provisions respecting jurisdiction (competence) and venue.7Sweeney, The Uniform Regime Governing the Liability of Maritime Carriers, 1992 I1
Diritto Marittimo -. See Moore, Bills of Lading-From Clippers to Containers, 7 Lloyd's
Mar. L. Newsl.-N. Am. Ed. 3-6 (Apr. 15, 1990).
846 U.S.C. Appx. § 190 (1988), entitled Stipulations Relieving From Liability for Negli-
gence, provides:
It shall not be lawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any vessel transporting
merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports to
insert in any bill of lading or shipping document any clause, covenant, or agreement
whereby it, he, or they shall be relieved from liability for loss or damage arising from
negligence, fault, or failure in proper loading, stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery
of any and all lawful merchandise or property committed to its or their charge. Any and
all words or clauses of such import inserted in bills of lading or shipping receipts shall be
null and void and of no effect.
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stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery" of cargo. Section Two9
forbids bill of lading clauses that lessen the carrier's obligation to use
due diligence to "equip, man, provision and outfit" and to make the
vessel "seaworthy and capable of performing her intended voyage"
and "to carefully handle and stow her cargo and properly deliver" it.
These provisions are applicable "from or between ports of the United
States and foreign ports." [emphasis added] The restriction to export
bills of lading in Sections One and Two conforms to the then-
prevalent conflict of laws viewpoint that the law of the port where the
bill was issued governed legal issues concerning the making of the
bill. 10
Section Three," the most enigmatic, contains the bargain between
shippers and carriers. 12 It is even more obscurely drafted. To begin
with, the statute applies to vessels carrying cargo "to or from any
port in the United States of America." The legal nexus to the United
States, however, is the performance of the voyage rather than the
946 U.S.C. Appx. § 191 (1988), entitled Stipulations Relieving From Exercise of Due
Diligence in Equipping Vessels, provides:
It shall not be lawful for any vessel transporting merchandise or property from or between
ports of the United States of America and foreign ports, her owner, master, agent, or
manager, to insert in any bill of lading or shipping document any covenant or agreement
whereby the obligations of the owner or owners of said vessel to exercise due diligence [to]
properly equip, man, provision, and outfit said vessel, and to make said vessel seaworthy
and capable of performing her intended voyage, or whereby the obligations of the master,
officers, agents, or servants to carefully handle and stow her cargo and to care for and
properly deliver same, shall in any wise be lessened, weakened, or avoided.
The seaworthiness obligation under the Harter Act is non-delegable, as it is under COGSA. See
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Joseph Gudract Co., 10 F.2d 769, 1926 AMC 347 (9th Cir.
1926).
10 See Bank of California v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 64 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 290 U.S. 649 (1933). See also G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 130-39 (2d
ed. 1975).
"46 U.S.C. Appx. § 192 (1988), entitled Limitation of Liability for Errors of Navigation,
Dangers of the Sea and Acts of God, provides:
If the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the
United States of America shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel in all
respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and supplied, neither the vessel, her
owner or owners, agent, or charterers, shall become or be held responsible for damage or
loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel nor
shall the vessel, her owner or owners, charterers, agent, or master be held liable for losses
arising from dangers of the sea or other navigable waters, acts of God, or public enemies,
or the inherent defect, quality, or vice of the thing carried, or from insufficiency of
package, or seizure under legal process, or for loss resulting from any act or omission of
the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or representative, or from saving or
attempting to save life or property at sea, or from any deviation in rendering such service.
12See Gilmore & Black, supra note 10, at 142-44; A. Knauth, The American Law of Ocean
Bills of Lading 121-22 (4th ed. 1953); and G. Robinson, Handbook of Admiralty Law in the
United States 495-500 (1939).
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issuance of bills of lading. This section deals with the effects of
negligence and the efforts of carriers not "to become or be held
responsible for damage or loss" or "to be held liable for losses." Its
single sentence grammatical construction is ambiguous as the word
"nor" may have been used to connect different thoughts. In the first
portion of the sentence the carrier interests (described as "the vessel,
her owner or owners, agent, or charterers")' 13 shall not be liable under
two new statutory defenses: "faults or errors in navigation or in the
management" of the ship if the owner shall have exercised "due
diligence to make the said vessel in all respects seaworthy and
properly manned, equipped, and supplied."
A debate exists whether the introductory condition (due diligence)
applies to both the negligent navigation and management defense in
the "neither" clause as well as the older traditional defenses in the
"nor" clause. It appears that the "neither-nor" construction was
used because of the absence of the word "master" in the clause
stating the defense of negligent navigation but its presence in the list
of those to be exonerated by the older defenses. The sentence then
describes a series of traditional carrier defenses without clarifying
whether the seaworthiness due diligence must be proved by the
carrier before these defenses may be raised.' 4
Section Four 5 states the carrier's obligation to issue a bill of lading
or shipping document, the mandatory contents16 of the bill, and the
13See supra note 11.
14While there is no direct interpretation of the grammatical structure, in The Delaware, 161
U.S. 459 (1896), discussed infra note 61, the Court looked to the intent of Congress in governing
the shipper-carrier relation with new defenses and a restatement of older case law. There were
no conditions precedent to these older defenses in earlier statements of the law, thus "nor"
becomes a disjunctive conjunction dividing the sentence into two distinct parts.
For a contrary view, see the opinion of Judge Levet in Blanchard Lumber Co. v. S.S.
Anthony II, 259 F. Supp. 857, 867, 1967 AMC 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1966): "Under section 3 of the
Harter Act owners... may not" be held liable for losses arising from dangers of the sea "ifdue
diligence has been exercised to make the ship seaworthy." In this view, "nor" is a correlative
coordinating conjunction so that the "if' clause modifies both the new defenses and the older
ones. See Robinson, supra note 12, at 525-26.
1546 U.S.C. Appx. § 193 (1988), entitled Bills of Lading to be Issued; Contents, provides:
It shall be the duty of the owner or owners, masters, or agent of any vessel transporting
merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports to
issue to shippers of any lawful merchandise a bill of lading, or shipping document, stating,
among other things, the marks necessary for identification, number of packages, or
quantity, stating whether it be carrier's or shipper's weight, and apparent order or
condition of such merchandise or property delivered to and received by the owner,
master, or agent of the vessel for transportation, and such document shall be prima facie
evidence of the receipt of the merchandise therein described.
16Compare the mandatory contents of bills of lading in COGSA, 46 U.S.C. Appx. § 1303(3)
(1988):
Vol. 24, No. I
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legal consequence of the issue.' 7 Section Five' 8 provides a personal
criminal penalty for failure to issue the bill of lading on demand and
creates a statutory maritime lien on the vessel.
Section Six 19 preserves the 1851 Fire Statute and the owner's right
to limit liability. Section Seven 20 excludes the transport of live
animals from the prohibition of clauses relieving the carrier from
negligence liability and the obligation to issue a bill of lading with
mandatory contents.
a. Marks necessary for identification
b. Number of packages or quantity or weight
c. Apparent good order and condition
and the Hamburg Rules, Art. 15(1):
a. General nature, marks, dangerous character, number of packages and weight or
quantity
b. Apparent good order and condition
c. Name and principal place of business of carrier
d. Name of shipper
e. Consignee, if named
f. Port of loading, and date goods taken over
g. Port of discharge
h. Number of originals
i. Place of issue of bill of lading
j. Signature of carrier
k. Freight payable by consignee
i. Clause Paramount
m. Deck carriage
n. Agreed date of delivery
o. Agreed increased limit of liability.
1746 U.S.C. Appx. § 193 (1988) reads: "prima facie evidence of the receipt of the
merchandise therein described." Cf. COGSA, 46 U.S.C. Appx. § 1303(4) (1988), which reads:
"prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein described in
accordance with paragraphs 3(a), (b), and (c), of this section." Cf. also Hamburg Rules, Art. 16.
1846 U.S.C. Appx. § 194 (1988), entitled Penalties; Lien; Recovery, provides:
For a violation of any of the provisions of sections 190-193 of this title the agent, owner,
or master of the vessel guilty of such violation, and who refuses to issue on demand the
bill of lading provided for, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding $2,000. The amount of the
fine and costs for such violations shall be a lien upon the vessel, whose agent, owner, or
master is guilty of such violation, and such vessel may be libeled therefor in any district
court of the United States, within whose jurisdiction the vessel may be found. One-half of
such penalty shall go to the party injured by such violation and the remainder to the
government of the United States.
1946 U.S.C. Appx. § 196 (1988), entitled Certain Laws Unaffected, provides:
Sections 190-195 of this title shall not be held to modify or repeal sections 181, 182, and
183 of this title, or any other statute defining the liability of vessels, their owners, or
representatives.
2046 U.S.C. Appx. § 195 (1988), entitled Certain Provisions Inapplicable to Transportation of
Live Animals, provides:
Sections 190 and 193 of this title shall not apply to the transportation of live animals.
January 1993
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B. The Situation in the Courts
The immediate need for the statute was a decision of the Supreme
Court 2 that dramatically altered the shipper-carrier relationship that
was in the process of being developed by British shipping interests. 22
Cargo carried aboard the British ship Montana from New York to
Liverpool was lost when the vessel went aground near Holyhead,
Wales. The subrogee cargo insurer sued the carrier to recover the
damages allegedly caused by the carrier's servants' negligence.
The carrier defended on the basis of a bill of lading clause
exculpating the carrier from liability for its own negligence. 23 The
startling decision of the Supreme Court was that the exculpatory
clause was void as against public policy. 2a In explaining its decision,
the Court referred to its earlier decisions on railroad bills of lading in
which similar exculpatory clauses were held invalid. 25 Thus, the
effect of railroad precedent overcame the theory that parties have an
absolute right to freedom of contract based on the "Due Process"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 26
21Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
22British shipowning interests were organizing defensively and aggressively in the second
half of the nineteenth century. The first modem P&I club-the Steamship Owners' Mutual
Protection and Indemnity Association-was formed in 1874, and the first conference for liner
shipping service-The Calcutta Steam Traffic Conference-was created in 1875. See generally
N. Singh & R. Colinvaux, Shipowners 96-112, 208-28 (1967). The English courts also appeared
to be protective of owners in upholding exculpatory clauses. See Tattersall v. National
Steamship Co., 12 Q.B. Div. 297 (1884), and In re Missouri S.S. Co., 42 Ch. D. 321 (1889).23Liverpool & Great Western, 129 U.S. at 400. Before listing a series of excepted perils, the
clause provided: ". . . (whether arising from the negligence, default or error in judgment of the
masters, mariners, engineers or others of the crew, or otherwise howsoever)."24Id. at 441-42.
25Id. at 443 (citing Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 384 (1873)). The background of
the railroad cases is greatly different, however, since farmer discontent with the pricing
practices of the railroads led to political agitation in the Grangers' Movement (after 1865) and
a political third party when the two major parties ignored the problem. See generally S. Buck,
The Granger Movement (1913).
26The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as the protector of property rights
including "freedom of contract" is usually traced from the dissent of Justice Field in the
Granger Cases, see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), to the majority opinion in Wabash, St.
Louis & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (holding state regulation of railroad
contracts unconstitutional); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890) (requiring judicial review of state rate setting commissions); Pollock v. Farmer's Loan &
Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (finding the federal income tax unconstitutional); Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (applying substantive due process to state fixing of rates); and finally,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding a state law setting maximum hours for
bakers to be unconstitutional as an interference with freedom of contract).
The intellectual foundations of this Social-Darwinist philosophy usually are traced from
Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology (1875), William Graham Sumner's What Social
Classes Owe to Each Other (1883), and Thomas M. Cooley's The Constitutional Limitations
Vol. 24, No. 1
The necessity for federal action was reenforced by a decision of the
New York State Court of Appeals that, adhering to earlier precedent
in the face of the Supreme Court's decision, upheld the exculpatory
clauses in an ocean bill of lading as part of the freedom of contract. 27
Seven states had enacted differing forms of legislation dealing in part
with transportation under bills of lading. 28
C. Supreme Court Cases on Cargo Damage
Despite its use of railroad precedent in Liverpool and Great
Western v. Phenix Insurance Co., 29 the Supreme Court's decision
was not out of line with earlier decisions that dealt with the relations
of shippers and carriers over the seventy-year period while the
business of shipping became more confrontational.
In The Lexington,30 the owners of a steamboat were held fully
liable, despite an exculpatory clause and a unit limitation clause, for
the loss of a chest of gold and silver coins worth about $18,000 when
their unseaworthy vessel sank following a fire. Clark v. Barnwell3l
concerned negligence rather than unseaworthiness. There, the Su-
preme Court approved the right of shippers to defeat general excul-
patory clauses with proof of carrier negligence.3 2
In Propeller Niagra v. Cordes,3 3 the Supreme Court applied
elements of the bailee's strict liability in common law to establish the
which Rest Upon the Legislative Power (1868), as well as his General Principles of Constitu-
tional Law in the United States (1880). See generally R. McCloskey, American Conservatism
in the Age of Enterprise: A Study of William Graham Sumner, Stephen J. Field and Andrew
Carnegie (1951), and McCloskey, Economic Due Process and The Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and a Reburial, in American Constitutional Law: Historical Essays (L. Levy ed.
1966). See also B. Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez-Faire Came to the
Supreme Court (1942).27Robertson v. National Steamship Co., 139 N.Y. 416, 34 N.E. 1053 (1893). See also
Glendell v. Thompson, 56 N.Y. 194 (1874); Spinetti v. Atlas S.S. Co., 80 N.Y. 71 (1880); and
Rubens v. The Ludgate Hill S.S. Co., 20 N.Y.S. 481 (First Dep't 1892), aff'd mem., 143 N.Y.
629, 37 N.E. 825 (1894).28Wheeler, The Harter Act: Recent Legislation in the United States Respecting Bills of
Lading, 33 Am. L. Rev. 801 (1899).
29See supra note 21 at 443.
3
°New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank (The Lexington), 47 U.S. 344 (1848).
3153 U.S. 272 (1851).
32
,Notwithstanding, therefore, the proof was clear that the damage was occasioned by the
effect of the humidity and dampness of the vessel, which is one of the dangers of navigation, it
was competent for the libelants to show that the respondents might have prevented it by proper
skill and diligence in the discharge of their duties[.]" Id. at 282.
3362 U.S. 7 (1858). The general maritime law defenses of the common carrier were restated
in the same way in Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S.
411, 1959 AMC 1631 (1959).
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defenses available to carriers under the general maritime law. It also
enforced the carrier's continuing obligation to care for the cargo even
after the occurrence of a cause of loss excepted in the bill of lading.
In Bulkeley v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co.,34 the shipper's right to
arrest the vessel for cargo damage was created by the recognition of
a maritime lien against the cargo-carrying vessel under the general
maritime law. Lastly, the two cases of The Alabama35 and The Atlas 36
eased shippers' recovery of damages where cargo was lost or
damaged in a collision by imposing joint and several liability on both
the carrier and non-carrier vessels involved in the collision.
The foregoing decisions put the American courts on a path greatly
different from that being followed in the United Kingdom. 37 We can
therefore speculate that the Supreme Court may have been well
aware of the decline of the American merchant marine, our reliance
on the British merchant fleet to carry our foreign trade, and the need
for American courts to protect American shippers.38 The response of
British carriers to the decisions was the forum selection clause
(London) and the law selection clause (English law) to avoid the
effect of American courts invalidating carrier negligence clauses.
Before the American courts could invalidate these new clauses in
turn, Congress acted to protect American public policy. 39
1465 U.S. 386 (1860).
3'92 U.S. 695 (1876).
3693 U.S. 302 (1876).
37Missouri S.S. Co., supra note 22, ignored the traditional conflicts rule to apply British law
upholding an exculpatory clause where the law of the port of loading would have held the clause
invalid. The rationale was that the parties only intended the clause to be litigated in a forum that
would uphold it. Respecting several (as opposed to joint and several) liability of the colliding
vessels to damaged cargo, see The Milan, 167 Eng. Rpt. 167 (1861). See Yiannopoulos, Bills of
Lading and the Conffict of Laws: Validity of Negligence Clauses in England, 37 Det. L.J. 199
(1959).38prior to the Civil War, the proportion of foreign flag carriage of United States foreign trade
was about 33% for the years 1855-59, but the effect of the Northern blockade of the South and
the destruction of northern shipping by Confederate commerce raiders was to increase foreign
participation to 56%. As British steam-driven iron ships replaced wooden sailing ships, foreign
participation (chiefly British), measured by values of cargoes, increased from 64% in 1870 to
83% in 1880 and 87% in 1890. Gross tonnage of the United States ocean-going fleet declined
from 38% in 1870 to 19% in 1880. See J. Hutchins, The American Maritime Industries and
Public Policy, 1789-1914, 254-55, 324, 540 (1941).39Demands for congressional action by United States cargo interests because of British
choice of law and forum clauses can be found in H.R. Report No. 1988, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1892), cited in The Delaware, infra note 61.
Discussion on the floor of the House by Congressman Lind cited choice of forum and choice
of law clauses favoring England as a reason for the proposed bill. See 24 Cong. Rec. 148 (1892).
Congressmen Coombs and Harter also referred to the clauses favoring English carriers as
making American shippers helpless and in need of the protection of the bill. Id. at 171-72. It has
Vol. 24, No. 1
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D. Legislative History
To summarize the Harter Act simply, it legislates a compromise or
package deal between conflicting economic interests. The shippers
achieved the prohibition of broad exculpatory clauses in adhesion
agreements evidenced by bills of lading, while the carriers obtained
two new defenses: negligent navigation and negligent management, as
well as the elimination of the strict warranty of seaworthiness.
Undoubtedly, the reason for the poor drafting was the shaky nature
of a compromise that was patched together in haste at the end of a
legislative session.
The Harter Act began with a bill by Congressman Michael D.
Harter, a Democrat from Ohio, 40 in the Second Session of the
Fifty-second Congress. That bill dealt with carrier exculpatory
clauses. The Congress had been elected in November 1890 during the
administration of President Benjamin Harrison. 41 Harter's bill, H.R.
been estimated that the British merchant marine in 1900 was 52% of world shipping. D.
Howarth, Sovereign of the Seas 332 (1974).
The vehicle for invalidating forum selection and law selection clauses under COGSA is 46
U.S.C. Appx. § 1303(8) (1988). See Indussa Corp. v. The Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 1967 AMC 589
(2d Cir. 1967), and Hughes Drilling Fluids v. The Luo Fu Shan, 852 F.2d 840, 1988 AMC 2848
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
4OMichael Daniel Harter (1846-96) was born in Canton, Ohio, where he attended the public
schools. He subsequently moved to Mansfield, Ohio, where he became the treasurer and
manager of Aultman & Taylor Co. His career before election to Congress in 1890 was that of
a small town businessman and banker. He had previously campaigned, unsuccessfully, for the
state senate on a free-trade, low tariff platform, which assisted his success in the 1890 mid-term
election. He was reelected to Congress in 1892, but as a gold Democrat he stuck with President
Cleveland in the battle between gold and silver which tore his party apart. He left Congress in
1895 to follow a banking career in Philadelphia. He died, by his own hand, on February 22,
1896. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1896, at 1, col. 5; Feb. 24, 1896, at 5, col. 4.
Harter's bill was supposedly directed at a proposal to insert this exculpatory clause in the
1892 New York Produce Exchange Bill of Lading: "The carrier shall not be liable for losses
occasioned by negligence, default or error in judgment of the pilot, master, mariners or other
servants of the shipowners, not resulting, however, in any case from want of due diligence by
the owners of the ship or any of them, or by the ship's husband or manager." Wheeler, supra
note 28, at 805-06.
41In the election of November 1890, a divided Congress was returned by the voters. The
Senate was organized by Republicans (47 Republicans, 39 Democrats, and 2 Populists), while
the House was organized by Democrats (231 Democrats, 88 Republicans, 9 Populists, and 5
Independents). Political analysts blamed the defeat of Republicans in the House and Senate on
the high tariff legislation contained in the 1890 McKinley Tariff Act. See generally Rhodes,
History of the United States from Hayes to McKinley, 1919, in VIII J. F. Rhodes, History of
the United States from the Compromise of 1850 (1928); A. Nevins, Grover Cleveland, A Study
in Courage 463-510 (1932); L. White, Republican Era (1869-1901) 20-67, 93-109 (1958); and M.
Josephson, The Politicos 454-517 (1938).
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9176, was passed by the House after debate on December 15, 1892.42
The essence of Harter's bill now can be found in the first two sections
of the present statute. 43 The legislation was strongly supported by
Congressman John Lind, a Democrat from Minnesota. 44
The election of November 1892 took place during the legislative
session and returned Grover Cleveland to the presidency and Dem-
ocratic control to both houses of Congress. Yet since the new
president would not be in office until March 4, 1893, and the new
congress was not scheduled to meet until December 1893, 45 the
Harter Act cannot be considered in any way a party measure,
especially since both parties may have been part of the unrecorded
majority. 46
The House bill was reported to the Senate on December 20, 1892,
and was promptly referred to the Committee on Commerce. Amend-
ments were proposed and hearings were held on January 26-27,
1893. 47 The final form of the compromise was agreed to and the
42See 24 Cong. Rec. 147-49 and 171-73 (1892). The Report of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce is reproduced at 24 Cong. Rec. 148-49. The Report begins
with a statement of the value of United States grain exports in the fiscal year to June 30, 1892
($296,877,418), and emphasizes the imperative duty to remove all unnecessary burdens from the
grain trade. Mr. Lind, while introducing the bill on the first day of debate, stressed that it "....
seeks to give our citizens some protection as against foreign shipowners, so long as we have not
vessels of our own to carry on this traffic." Id. at 148. On the second day, both Congressman
Lind and Congressman Harter stressed that American sailing vessels would not be affected and
that only foreign vessels (presumably British steam vessels) would suffer. Id. at 171-72.
4346 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 190 and 191 (1988).
44John Lind (1854-1930) was born in Smaland, Sweden, and came to Minnesota with his
parents at age 14. He then went to public schools and the University of Minnesota. Admitted
to the Minnesota bar in 1876, he practiced in Minneapolis, then served three terms in Congress
(1887-93), then served as Governor (1899-1901), and finally returned to Congress (1903-05). See
G. Stephenson, John Lind, Minnesota Governor (1935).45See "Election of 1892" in 2 History of American Presidential Elections (1789-1968) (A.
Schlesinger, Jr. & F. Israel eds. 1971). The dates for assuming office were altered by the
Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1933.
46That the Harter Act was intended to protect American interests against the domination of
the British merchant marine in the Atlantic is noted in Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide
Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327, 1979 AMC 2787 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012
(1980).
Two earlier congressional reports had examined the parlous state of the American ocean-
going merchant marine. See Report of the House Committee on Commerce on the Causes of the
Decadence of our Merchant Marine, Means for its Restoration, and the Extension of Foreign
Commerce (1881), House Rep. 342, 46th Cong., 3d Sess., and Report of the House Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on the American Merchant Marine in Foreign Trade (1890),
House Rep. 1210, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (popularly known as The Farquhar Report). See also
House Reports No. 1665, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1884), and No. 1988, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1892).47The Senate Commerce Committee's Hearings are reported in The New York Times, Jan.
27, 1893, at 3, cols. 4 and 5, and Jan. 28, 1893, at 2, col. 6. Representatives of shippers,
Vol. 24, No. 1
Reappraisal of Harter 11
redrafting of Section Three took place in committee, transforming the
warranty of seaworthiness into a duty to use due diligence. Because
these proceedings were officially unreported, a veil has been drawn
over the most crucial part of the legislative process.
On February 4, 1893, the Commerce Committee reported favorably
to the full Senate, which passed an amended form of the bill on the
same day. 48 An unreported conference committee meeting was then
held and on February 7, 1893, the House passed the Senate's
insurance underwriters, and the Chamber of Commerce alternately praised and attacked the
House bill. The newspaper described the bill as in the interest of shippers to increase the
responsibilities of carriers. Congressman Harter defended the bill along with C. A. Pillsbury of
Minneapolis. After two hours, the Chairman, Senator Frye (R-Maine), suggested that oppo-
nents of the bill were too divided in their comments and offered them a chance to talk it over
and agree among themselves as to their comments. This recess also offered an opportunity to
negotiate with shippers and on the second day of hearings the newspaper reported that both
sides had conferred with Senator Frye. Without describing the changes, the report said that
they had "amended the measure to the satisfaction of all parties concerned," including the
absent Congressman Harter. Knauth notes in his text the "legend" that the author of the
revised form of Section Three was Stephen Loines; J. Parker Kirlin of the New York Bar
presented the draft. Knauth, supra note 12, at 122.
If the foregoing is true, the drafting of Section Three was the responsibility of two New
Yorkers: Joseph Parker Kirlin and Stephen Loines. J. Parker Kirlin (1861-1927) was a leader of
the admiralty bar in the United States for thirty-five years. He argued a number of the Harter
Act appeal cases before the Supreme Court: The Delaware, discussed infra note 61; The Carib
Prince, infra note 64; The Silvia, infra note 74; The Wildcroft, infra note 75; Knott v. Botany
Mills, infra note 90; and The Folmina, infra note 101. His arguments were successful in The
Silvia and The Wildcroft. One of his great victories was The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900). He represented the owner of the Titanic, 204 F. 298, 206 F. 500, and 209 F. 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1913), and the owner of the Lusitania, 251 F. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). During the First
World War he served as General Counsel of the Shipping Control Committee. Mr. Kirlin was
the attorney of record in 430 reported cases in the federal courts from 1891 to 1922 dealing with
all aspects of admiralty law.
Stephen Loines was an average adjuster and a member of the firm of Wreaks & Loines,
average adjusters in New York.
A hostile view of the Harter Act, especially Section Three, can be found in a letter to the
editor of The New York Times denouncing its provisions as "a bad measure in every way as the
shipowners were liable for nothing whatever." See letter of Robert D. Benedict, N.Y. Times,
May 3, 1893, at 12, col. 1. Mr. Benedict was the nephew of Erastus Benedict and prepared the
third edition (1894) of Benedict on Admiralty.
At the second day of hearings, the contending parties were present "to ratify the
agreement," after which the Committee unanimously agreed to report favorably the bill as
amended.
The Chairman of the Committee, William Pierce Frye (1831-1911), was a former Maine
Attorney General (1867--69) and member of Congress (1871-81). He served as a Senator from
1881-1911, and was the president pro tempore of the Senate when there was a Republican
majority.
48The Senate's consideration is found in 24 Cong. Rec. Part 2, at 1180. The entire record is
the Commerce Committee Report of amendments to H.R. 9176, read by Senator Frye. The
conferees on the part of the Senate were Senator Frye, Senator Washburn (R-Minnesota), and
Senator Gorman (D-Maryland).
January 1993
12 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
amended version49 after debate that did not reveal the reasoning for
the House's acceptance of the Senate's amendments.50 President
49The Conference Committee Report was made to the House by Congressman Lind, who
explained that the Senate amendments made certain that foreign shipowners would not have an
advantage over American shipowners in the prohibition of exculpatory clauses. The Congress-
man also painted a grim picture of the circumstances in which the negligent navigation defense
could be used:
Now, after a master, owner, or charterer has taken every precaution that human ingenuity
can suggest in equipping, manning, and in furnishing his vessel, nevertheless, if out on the
high seas in stress of weather or in storms, when every man is worn out with watching, if
a man falls asleep on the watch or commits any fault of navigation whereby injury results,
the master, owner, or charterer is held responsible under the law.
To this extent the bill relieves domestic shipping from those burdens ... they shall not be
liable for faults or errors of navigation, solely. Now, this is absolutely the only new feature
in the bill, except one other [the live animal exception].
24 Cong. Rec. Part 2, at 1291-2. Thereafter, the Senate amendments were concurred in by the
House without a recorded vote on the assurances of Congressman Lind that the bill was
satisfactory to shippers, underwriters, and "honest steamboat interests."
An early commentator has suggested that the favorable congressional action on the bill was
due to the fact that it was seen as another version of shipowners' limitation of liability. Such
limitation previously had been enacted in 1851 (9 Stat. 635), and more recently in 1884 (23 Stat.
57) and 1886 (24 Stat. 80). See Evans, The Harter Act and its Limitations, 8 Mich. L. Rev. 637
(1910).
5024 Cong. Rec. Part 2, at 1291. The obvious changes can be discerned by comparing the
House version of H.R. 9176 with the changes made by the Senate:
I. The unenacted description of the original House version was:
An act relating to contracts of common carriage and to certain obligations, duties, and
rights in connection with the carriage of property.
The Senate removed the reference to common carriage, as follows:
An act relating to navigation of vessels, bills of lading" . . . (House language follows).
Also, the original House version of Section One had begun:
It shall not be lawful for any common carrier or the manager, agent, master, or owner
... The expression "common carrier" was deleted by the House.
2. In the list of duties, Section One of the House version provided:
... proper loading, stowage, custody, care in transport, or proper delivery ....
The Senate version deleted "in transport." The penultimate conclusion of Section One
had a prohibition of limitation of liability clauses, as follows:
Nor shall it be lawful to limit its or their liability to less than a full indemnity to the legal
claimant for any loss or damage therefrom.
The Senate version deleted this completely. (Language deleted by the Senate is
emphasized.)
3. Section Three of the House version provided:
If any vessel transporting merchandise or property between ports in the United States
of America and foreign ports shall, on starting her voyage, be in all respects seaworthy
and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the vessel, her owner or owners,
agent or master, shall become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from
error of judgment in navigation or in the management of said vessel if navigated with
ordinary skill and care, from the time of her leaving her usual place of loading on her
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Harrison signed the bill on February 13, 1893, to be effective July 1,
1893.51
Public opinion was not greatly concerned with the maritime poli-
cies discussed during the House's debate over the Harter Act. The
issues dividing the voters in 1892 were the high protective tariff,5 2 the
organization of labor,5 3 railroad operations,5 4 and the effect of com-
intended voyage until her arrival at the usual place of discharge at her port of delivery,
nor shall the owner or owners, the vessel, or master be held liable for losses arising
from dangers of the sea, acts of God, or public enemies or in saving life, and it may be
stipulated in bills of lading and shipping receipts that the vessel may render services to
property in distress afloat and tow same to the nearest and most convenient port of
safety without incurring penalties from deviation in rendering such services.
(Language deleted by the Senate is emphasized.) The Senate version completely
rewrote the sentence. Significant changes are the deletion of the voyage concept and
the attempt to specify its commencement and termination. The geographical reach
"between ports ... and foreign ports" was rephrased as "to or from any port in the
United States." The obligation to make the vessel seaworthy in all respects and
properly manned, equipped, and supplied was retained but was preceded by the
overriding obligation in the Senate version to "exercise due diligence." The House's
"error of judgment in navigation" became "faults or error of judgment in navigation"
in the Senate version and the House's precondition "if navigated with ordinary skill
and care" was entirely deleted. The House's list of the defenses was greatly enlarged
by the Senate, which added "other navigable waters" to "dangers of the sea" plus
"inherent defect, quality or vice of the thing carried, or from insufficiency of package,
or seizure under legal process, or for loss resulting from any act or omission of the
shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or representative, or from attempting to save
life or property at sea or from any deviation in rendering such services." The clumsy
language of the House version permitting salvage and tow also was deleted. See supra
note 8.
4. The House's Section Five imposing impossible obligations on collectors of ports to
review bills of lading was replaced, at the insistence of the Treasury Department, by the
existing section providing maritime lien and penalties.
5124 Cong. Rec. Part 2, at 1603 (1893).52 Tariff rates became a hot political issue after 1816 when the tariff began to be used to
protect infant industries. Indeed, Southerners threatened secession as early as 1828 over the
"Tariff of Abominations." The protectionist trend resumed after the Civil War in legislation
passed in 1870, 1872, 1875, and 1883. Finally, in 1890, Congress enacted the McKinley Tariff.
Fulfilling the Republican platform's promise of high protective tariffs, the average level of duties
reached 49.5%, together with penalties imposed on the products of foreign nations that
discriminated against American products. F. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States
251-288 (1931).53 Labor unrest followed the 1866 collapse of the National Labor Union and soon turned to
violence. The acts of the Molly Maguires (1862-76) and other terrorist groups led to clashes with
both the police and troops, most notably in the battle of Pittsburgh on July 21, 1877, the
Haymarket Riot/Massacre of May 4, 1886, and the Homestead Riot/Massacre of July 6, 1892.
Peaceful organization of skilled workers proceeded under Samuel Gompers' American Feder-
ation of Labor after 1886, but there was a further outbreak of violence during the Pullman strike
of June-July 1894. J. Commons, ed., 2 History of Labour in the United States 356-95 (1918).54 Land grants in excess of 155 million acres of public lands had been made by Congress and
state legislatures to encourage the building of railroads in the period 1862-95. Fraudulent stock
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binations on American industrial life in such products as oil, steel,
sugar, glass, copper, tobacco, rubber, farm machinery, leather,
matches, and more than three hundred other essential items. 55 Thus,
the Harter Act can be viewed as part of the effort to protect the free
market by removing unfair advantages, along with the 1887 Interstate
Commerce Commission Act, 56 and the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act.5 7
III.
INTERPRETATION OF THE HARTER ACT
A. Supreme Court Cases
The consistent interpretation by the courts has been that the
purpose of the Haiter Act is remedial.5 8 As such, they have held that
manipulations and bankruptcy followed, so that by 1890 consolidation and reorganization was
occurring in the Eastern railroad system and was beginning to spread south and west. See
generally Railroads: Nation's First Businesses (A. Chandler ed. 1965).
55Concentration of economic power in relatively few hands through devices such as
"trusts," holding companies, and pools was the feature of the period 1875-1900. Business
unrest during this time was demonstrated by the great financial panics of 1873 and 1893. The
panic of 1893 was precipitated by a drop in United States gold reserves in April, followed by a
stock market crash in June. See I. Tarbell, Nationalizing of Business 1878-1898, 220-48 (1936).
56The Interstate Commerce Commission Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379 (applicable to
railroads passing through more than one state), responded to increasing public criticism of
railroad financial malpractices and customer complaints of overcharging. Initial efforts to
control railroads at the state level were frustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Wabash,
St. Louis & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). The new Commission could
investigate the industry by requiring production of company records. The legislation also
required that all railroad freight rates be reasonable, although it did not give the Commission the
power to fix the rates. Other provisions prohibited discriminatory rates, drawbacks, rebates,
and pooling, and outlawed higher charges for short haul as opposed to long haul on the same
railroad. See generally Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: A
Reconsideration, 53 J. Am. Hist. 751 (1959), and Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and The Interstate
Commerce Commission, 81 Pol. Sci. Q. 602 (1966).
5715 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988). See generally W. Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America:
Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act 71-99 (1965), and Letwin, First Decade of the Sherman
Act, 68 Yale L.J. 464, 900 (1959). Individual state responses to the concentration of economic
power in trusts were frustrated by federal preemption under the federal commerce power,
hence the necessity for uniform federal legislation.
58The Supreme Court early described the statutory purpose to relax the strict shipowner
obligation of seaworthiness to an obligation to use due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.
See The Delaware, infra note 61. The Court also commented on the political and economic
background of the Harter Act:
The Act was an outgrowth of attempts, made in recent years, to limit, as far as possible,
the liability of the vessel and her owners, by inserting in bills of lading stipulations against
losses arising from unseaworthiness, bad stowage and negligence in navigation, and other
forms of liability which had been held by the courts of England, if not of this country, to
be valid as contracts and to be respected even when they exempted the ship from the
consequences of her own negligence.
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the Harter Act should be read strictly rather than loosely and that
carriers should not be exculpated any further than the exact language
mandates.5 9 While the lower courts usually have endorsed the carri-
ers' viewpoint of the Act's provisions, the cargo interests consis-
tently have prevailed in disputes resolved by the Supreme Court in
this century.
The following review is not merely historical. Harter Act cases still
are cited as authoritative interpretations of those provisions of
COGSA that are similar to the Harter Act. 60 There is no doubt that
some of its wisdom also may be applied to more modem regimes,
such as the Hamburg Rules.
1. Harter Act Limited to the Shipper-Carrier Relation
In The Delaware,6' a both-to-blame collision between a steamship
(in sole fault for violation of the crossing rules) and a tug that sank,
the steamship's defense to an action by the tug was a literal reading
1 1 U.S. at 471. The Court foresaw that the consequence of unlimited exculpatory clauses
would be that the bill of lading would become "unfit for negotiation." Id. at 473.
After enactment of the Harter Act, the Supreme Court provided a clear example of the
change from the absolute warranty of seaworthiness to the due diligence obligation in The
Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124 (1895), a pre-Harter case involving cattle transported under a bill of
lading. Due to the unseaworthiness of the vessel-a broken propeller shaft-the planned fifteen
day voyage became a twenty-five day ordeal. The exceptions in the carrier's bill of lading were
invalid against the seaworthiness warranty, the Court noted, because a warranty of seaworthi-
ness exists in every contract of carriage at the beginning of the voyage so that neither the
carrier's knowledge nor ignorance of unseaworthiness, nor its best efforts to make the ship
seaworthy, can defeat the absolute warranty. Id. at 130. See also The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1,
7 (1903), and The Carib Prince, infra note 64.
The Third Circuit once described the purpose of the legislation as the protection of shippers
from unseaworthiness, bad stowage, and negligence, as well as an attempt to stop the "frittering
away" of common law responsibilities. The Willdomino, 300 F. 5, 9 (3d Cir. 1924), cert.
dismissed, 270 U.S. 641 (1926).
Modem support for the Harter Act has come from the Ninth Circuit, which stresses its
purpose to avoid the persistent efforts of carriers to insert all-embracing exceptions to liability.
Isthmian Steamship Corp. v. California Spray Chemical Corp., 300 F.2d 41, 1962 AMC 1474
(9th Cir. 1962); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 559
F.2d 1173, 1978 AMC 1834 (9th Cir. 1977); and Sunkist Growers, supra note 46.
The Supreme Court has described the function of the Harter Act as altering the public policy
against broad exculpatory clauses in a decision that struck down the "Both to Blame Collision
Clause" as a violation of public policy. United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236,
239-242, 1952 AMC 659 (1952). See infra notes 81-89.
59 The Germanic, 124 F. 1, 5 (2d Cir.), aft'd, 196 U.S. 589 (1903).
6°See The Bill, 47 F. Supp. 969, 1942 AMC 1607 (D. Md. 1942), aff'd, 145 F.2d 470, 1944
AMC 883 (4th Cir. 1943). See also Wirth v. S.S. Arcadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1282, 1976 AMC
2178 (5th Cir. 1976).
61161 U.S. 459 (1896).
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of the Harter Act: if the vessel owner proves due diligence, there is
no liability for negligent navigation. The Supreme Court properly
ignored the literal reading of Section Three of the Harter Act and read
the statute in light of congressional intent to have no effect on the
liability of colliding vessels. 62
2. Exculpatory Clauses Dealing with Latent Defects
Prior to the Harter Act compromise, the Court had described the
shipowner's obligation to cargo (and passengers) as a continuing duty
to make the ship seaworthy from the beginning of the voyage. 63
Exculpatory clauses, however, freed the carrier from the conse-
quences of negligence during the voyage. In The Carib Prince,64
cargo was damaged by ballast seawater entering the cargo hold from
a rivet hole (without a rivet) in the ballast tank. The carrier's defense
was a bill of lading clause exculpating the carrier from "latent defects
in hull, tackle, boilers and machinery." While the Harter Act forbade
clauses lessening the due diligence of the carrier in making the vessel
seaworthy, it did not specify the time of testing the obligation,
although a fair reading of the sequence of the duties and the
expression "intended voyage" implies a time period before the cargo
has been loaded. The carrier was held liable because the unplugged
rivet hole made the vessel unseaworthy when the voyage began.65
The Court refused to apply the latent defect clause to the pre-sailing
condition of the ship, although it indicated that it was prepared to
apply the clause to future defects occurring on the voyage. 66 The
inference of the Court's language was that the carrier could provide
a time limit on its due diligence so that for incidents arising thereafter,
the carrier could be exculpated by a carefully drawn clause. 67
621d. at 474.
63See The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S. 199 (1894).
64170 U.S. 655 (1898). On latent defect clauses, see The Cameronia, 38 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.
1930), and The Citta di Palermo, 226 F. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), aff'd, 226 F. 529 (2d Cir. 1915).
65The Carib Prince, 170 U.S. at 658.
66Id. at 660.
671d. at 660-61. The Supreme Court later described its holding by saying: "The Harter Act
has not released the owner of a ship from the duty of making her seaworthy at the beginning of
her voyage." The Silvia, infra note 74, at 464. A later case, The Willdomino, supra note 58,
described The Carib Prince as permitting a carrier that exercises due diligence to make its ship
seaworthy to contract against liability for damage which may result from unseaworthiness. 300
F. at 10.
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3. Unit Limitation Clause Prohibited
In Calderon v. Atlas,68 goods had been lost in the sinking of a
vessel different from the one on which the goods had been shipped.
The carrier's defense was a clause in the bill limiting the shipper's
recovery to "$100 per package" and requiring that for recovery
beyond that amount the value therein had to be expressed and a
special agreement made. Plaintiff demanded the full value ($5,143),
while the carrier offered $100 for each of twenty-six bales and three
crates of uniforms ($2,900). The Supreme Court saw this as an
attempt at exoneration prohibited by the Harter Act. 69 Later cases
modified this outright prohibition of unit limitation. 70
4. Harter Act Does Not Affect General Average
In The Irrawaddy,71 a British vessel en route from Trinidad to New
York stranded on the New Jersey shore due to negligent navigation.
Some cargo was jettisoned and a general average bond was required
of cargo at delivery. The question for the Supreme Court was whether
the Harter Act had changed the owner-shipper relation in general
average. The Court decided that the Harter Act had not changed the
old rule that the shipowner could not recover general average
contribution from cargo for losses caused by the negligent navigation
of the vessel by the owner's servants. 72 The consequence of this
decision was the "Jason clause," which tracks the provisions of
Section Three of the Harter Act so that an owner that has exercised
due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy can recover general
average contributions from cargo even where the cause of the loss is
negligent navigation. 73
5. Carrier's Defenses During the Voyage
In The Silvia, 74 a British ship carried a cargo of sugar from Cuba to
Philadelphia. Its port holes were covered on the outside with an eight-
inch glass cover that was 5/8 of an inch thick and on the inside with
6'170 U.S. 272 (1898).
69 Id. at 282.
7 0See infra notes 133-35.
71171 U.S. 187 (1898).721d. at 193-94.
73The Jason, 225 U.S. 32 (1912). For a further discussion, see infra notes 101-10.
74171 U.S. 462 (1898).
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a cover of iron. When sailing in good weather, the glass port holes
were closed but the inner iron covers were not in place (the glass port
holes being used to light the hold). During heavy weather, a glass port
hole broke, water entered, and the sugar was damaged.
The issue was the vessel's reasonable seaworthiness at the begin-
ning of the voyage. It was held that the glass port holes were not
unseaworthy since they could be closed in a fairly short time. Thus,
the failure of the ship's personnel to close the iron port hole covers in
heavy weather became negligent management and the carrier had a
valid defense to the shipper's claim. 75 This was the most important
case favoring shipowner viewpoints. Unfortunately, the apparent
ease with which the defense was made out led shipowners in later
cases to argue mechanically that pre-sailing inspections qualified
them for the negligent navigation and management defenses. This
required the Court to develop burden of proof rules in much greater
detail in such subsequent cases as Knott v. Botany Mills, 76 Interna-
tional Navigation v. Farr,77 The Southwark,78 The Germanic,79 and
The Folmina.80
6. Indirect Liability of Carriers to Cargo: Joint and Several
Liability Preserved
In The Chattahoochee,81 following a collision between a steamer
and a schooner, the schooner sank with her cargo. Cargo sued the
steamer to recover 100% of its loss. When the collision action was
heard, the cargo liability claim was part of the steamer's claim against
the schooner and would be divided. The schooner argued that a literal
reading of the defense of negligent navigation (that the vessel interest
shall not "become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting
from faults or errors in navigation") included not only direct liability
to its own cargo but also indirect liability to the cargo by the operation
75Id. at 465. See also The Wildcroft, 201 U.S. 378 (1906), a case in which river water was
admitted into a cargo of sugar at the port of discharge because of valves that had been opened
either by accident or design. The Supreme Court affirmed the negligent management defense
but denounced an alleged presumption of seaworthiness at the beginning of the voyage as being
contra to the terms and policy of the Hailer Act.
76See infra note 90.
77See infra note 95.
78See infra note 97.
79See infra note 99.8
°See infra note 101.
81173 U.S. 540 (1899).
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of the maritime tort rules on joint and several liability in collisions. 82
This logical consequence of the statutory exculpation was rejected by
the Supreme Court because Congress had not indicated an intention
to overrule joint and several liability, as established in the earlier
cases of The Alabama83 and The Atlas.84
The consequence of The Chattahoochee is that cargo damaged in a
collision will recover 100% of its damages from the non-carrying
shipowner, who will then include these third party payments in its
collision damage claim. Under the old rule of equally divided dam-
ages for mutual fault,8 5 this meant that these payments to cargo would
be considered in the calculation for the single judgment customary in
collision litigation.8 6 Efforts of carriers to circumvent the indirect
liability to cargo by means of a bill of lading clause requiring cargo to
reimburse the carrier for any amounts received from the other
colliding vessel have been rejected by the Supreme Court as a
violation of public policy.8 7 It should be noted that the elimination of
the equally divided damages rule in 197588 has not changed the
indirect liability to a ship's own cargo caused by joint and several
liability.8 9
7. Care and Custody of Cargo Obligation Overrides Carrier
Negligent Navigation Defense
Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills9° has tormented generations of law
students. It concerned the change of trim of a vessel for navigational
purposes. When the plaintiff's cargo of bales of wool was loaded in
'tween deck spaces at Buenos Aires on board the British ship
Portug6se Prince for transport to New York, the vessel was trimmed
down by the stern. After loading wet sugar at Pernambuco in the
821d. at 550-51.
83See supra note 35.
84See supra note 36.
85See The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. 170 (1855).
86The North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882).
87United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. (The Esso Belgium), 343 U.S. 236, 1952 AMC
659 (1952). In 1937, the Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Ratification
of the 1910 Collision Convention (still unratified) indicated the belief that the indirect recovery
by cargo was contrary to congressional intent in both the Harter Act and the recently enacted
COGSA. See Senate Report, Maritime Collision Convention, Exec. Rpt. No. 4, reprinted at
1939 AMC 1051.
88United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 1975 AMC 541 (1975).
89Vana Trading Co. v. The Mette Skou, 556 F.2d 100, 1977 AMC 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 892 (1977).
90179 U.S. 69 (1899).
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adjoining space, separated only by a wooden non-watertight bulkhead
(watertight bulkheads not being permitted or required in these
spaces), however, the vessel was trimmed down by the bow. With the
new trim the wet sugar drained onto the wool.
The carrier's defense was negligent navigation or management of
the vessel, while the cargo claimed the damage was caused by carrier
negligence in stowing the wet sugar next to the wool cargo, a failure
to care for the cargo. The Supreme Court agreed that negligent
stowage rather than negligent navigation or management was respon-
sible. In so holding, it adopted the reasoning of the district court,
affirmed by the court of appeals, to the effect that the essential cause
of the damage was the negligent stowage, while the change of trim
was "merely incidental, the mere negligent result of the changes in
the loading, no attention being given to the effect on the ship's
trim.'91 Thus, the drawing of fine lines would in the future depend on
whether an act of seamanship was essential to the navigation or
merely incidental thereto. 92
Having rested the decision on Section One of the Harter Act
("from a port in the United States"), the Court then was confronted
with the fact that the bill of lading in question was issued in Buenos
Aires for carriage to New York. Despite this wrinkle, the Court held
that the Harter Act did apply. After noting the use of the phrase "to
or from" in Section Three, it found "from a port" to be the "precise
equivalent" of "to or from" 93 and reasoned that the power of
Congress to legislate in this manner could not be denied in a court of
the United States. 94
8. Non-Delegable Duty of Seaworthiness Overrides Negligent
Management
In International Navigation Co. v. Farr & Bailey Co., 95 salt water
damage occurred to the plaintiff's cargo in a hold of the vessel where
9 lId. at 74.
92The Germanic, supra note 59; U.S. Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 53 F.2d
1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Hampton Roads Carriers, Inc. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 329 F.2d 387
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1964); and United States v. Ultramar Shipping Co., 685
F. Supp. 887, 1988 AMC 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd without opinion, 854 F.2d 1315, 1988 AMC
2408 (2d Cir. 1988).93Knott, supra note 90, at 75: "But the two phrases, as applied to the subject matter, are
precisely equivalent, and are both equally applicable to a foreign voyage that ends, and to one
that begins, in this country."
94Id. at 74, 77.
95181 U.S. 218 (1901).
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a porthole's cover had been left open at the loading port (Liverpool),
probably because of the stevedores' mistake or even the mistake of
the ship's officers at the time of pre-voyage inspection. The defendant
raised negligent management in defense, but plaintiff alleged the
vessel's unseaworthiness at sailing. To counter this allegation, the
defendant asserted the seaworthiness of the vessel's structure and
equipment and its due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. The
Supreme Court rejected the defense of negligent management before
sailing, since the statute required that the ship be made seaworthy "in
all respects," which included the use of the seaworthy equipment by
the carrier's servants, agents, or independent contractors. Thus, the
carrier had not met the very heavy burden of proof to show the
seaworthiness of the vessel on sailing, a pre-condition for the
management defense. Due diligence, in this situation, meant "due
diligence on the part of all the owners' servants in the use of the
equipment before the commencement of the voyage and until it is
actually commenced.' '96
9. Carrier's Heavy Burden of Proof to Establish Due Diligence
In The Southwark,97 owners of a refrigerated ship sought to escape
the consequences of the breakdown of the refrigeration system on a
cargo of dressed meat by proving that there had been an inspection of
the refrigeration before sailing from Philadelphia for Liverpool.
Nevertheless, the refrigeration equipment broke down within three
hours of leaving port and the condition of the unrefrigerated meat on
arrival was mouldy and slimy. In the view of the Supreme Court, the
lower courts that had dismissed the libel had erred because they had
looked at the problem solely as a breakdown of machinery after the
voyage had commenced, rather than the obligation to use due
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. The carrier's burden of proof
to show that the vessel was in all respects seaworthy could not be met
by the slight evidence produced 98-- a superficial examination before
sailing followed three hours after sailing by a breakdown of the
refrigeration. Highly significant was the failure to keep a constant
96Id. at 225. Failure to have radio receivers to learn of storm warnings when such radios were
not required by statute, regulation, or trade usage resulted in an unseaworthy condition in the
T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 1932 AMC 1169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
97191 U.S. 1 (1903).
98Id. at 13. See generally Villareal, The Concept of Due Diligence in Maritime Law, 2 J. Mar.
L. & Com. 763 (1971).
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record of the temperatures in the refrigerated spaces instead of the
partial record that was offered.
10. Carrier's Heavy Burden of Proof to Establish Primary Object
of Action
The Germanic99 again raised the conflict between carrier defenses
in Section Three and the shipper's expectation under Section One.
After arrival of the vessel at a pier in New York following a voyage
from Liverpool, already heavily coated with ice, a heavy snowfall
occurred. In order to meet the ship's sailing schedule, discharge from
all five hatches simultaneously took place along with the loading of
coal bunkers. Swift action was taken to correct one listing of the
vessel, but five hours later asecond list developed and the ship rolled
over at the pier so that her coal ports were below the waterline. The
ship then sank at the pier, causing water damage to the plaintiff's
cargo.
The carrier's defense was negligent management of the ship, and it
asserted that any action dealing with the ship or cargo that affects the
fitness of the ship to carry her cargo is management under Section
Three. In an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court ruled that "the
primary nature and object of the acts which cause the loss" must
govern the conflict between Section One (duty to cargo) and Section
Three (defense of negligent management). 00 Here, unloading cargo
was the primary object, not ballasting the vessel. Thus, "hurried and
imprudent" unloading caused the sinking so that Section One's
obligation rather than Section Three's defenses governed the out-
come.
11. Burden of Proof to Establish Peril of the Sea Defense Does
Not Permit Inference of Non-Negligence
In The Folmina, 101 a cargo of rice being shipped from Japan to New
York was damaged by the unexplained entry of salt water. The
defendant alleged that the damage must have been caused by a peril
of the sea, but the Supreme Court rejected the defense because the
carrier had not sustained its burden of proof to show a connection
between the damaged cargo and a specific peril of the sea. The Court
99See supra note 59.
'0Id. at 598.
101212 U.S. 354 (1909).
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dismissed as "mere conjecture" the defendant's suggestion that a
peril of the sea must have been involved. In the Court's view, the
defense required precise proof of how the salt water came inside the
ship without defendant's negligence.102
12. Non-Causal Unseaworthiness
Perhaps the most radical interpretation of the Harter Act came
from Justice Cardozo in The Isis,103 decided by the Supreme Court
while the Hague Rules convention was being debated in the United
States. 104 The case involved cargo's attempt to recover a general
average deposit required by a carrier that had demanded contribution
in general average before discharge of the cargo. The carrier's
demand was based on the language of a Jason clause 10 5 in the bill of
lading. Because Jason clauses track the language of Section Three of
the Harter Act, the Supreme Court's resolution of the necessity for
seaworthiness as a condition precedent to the defense of negligent
navigation was the same in this general average context as it would
have been in a cargo damage case."'6
Cargo from the United States West Coast was being carried on a
German vessel that put in at Bremen on the Weser River before
calling at its home port of Hamburg on the Elbe River. The vessel
grounded in the Weser River while approaching Bremen due to
negligent navigation, thereby damaging the steering mechanism (rud-
der stock and blade). Since the vessel was allegedly seaworthy at the
time of the negligent navigation, cargo was required to contribute in
general average pursuant to the Jason clause.
The owner's Marine Superintendent came from Hamburg, seventy-
two land miles away, made a superficial inspection, and ordered the
vessel to proceed to Hamburg for repairs. The ship then grounded a
second time shortly after leaving Bremen due to negligent navigation
and the damaged steering mechanism.
Cargo's refusal to pay general average for the second grounding
was based on the unseaworthiness of the vessel after the first
grounding. Owner's direct management of the vessel had resumed at
1°2Id. at 363.
103May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt A.G. (The Isis), 290 U.S. 333 (1933).
'°4See generally Sturley, The History of COGSA and The Hague Rules, 22 J. Mar. L. &
Corn. 1 (1991) (hereinafter History of COGSA).
05The clause approved in The Jason, supra note 73, undid the result in The Irrawaddy, supra
note 71.
'°6The Isis, supra note 103, at 343-44.
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Bremen with the presence of the owner's Marine Superintendent,
who made the decision to resume the voyage to Hamburg. Thus,
there was a new period during which the owner had to exercise due
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. As the Court put it: "If the
term of management is over and the ship is in his hands again, the
duty is renewed."' 07 Thus, attempting the Bremen to Hamburg
voyage with faulty steering gear was "a needless enlargement of the
perils of navigation" that imposed on the shipper an additional risk
not imposed on it by the Harter Act. 108
Having determined that due diligence was not exercised at Bremen,
the question then turned on whether the cargo owners had the burden
of proving a causal relation between the defect and the loss. The
Court decided that no relation of cause and effect was necessary
because the Court valued "a uniform rule that will put an end to
controversy where the causal relation is uncertain or disputed."' 09
The very clear consequence of this decision is that the carrier will
be denied the negligent navigation and management defenses where
the cargo can show lack of due diligence in an unseaworthy condition
existing when the bill of lading voyage of its cargo began, regardless
of the fact that the unseaworthy condition did not cause the dam-
age.110
13. Carrier's Burden of Apportionment in Multiple Causation
The last case in the series of cases in which the Supreme Court
expanded the rights of shippers against the carrier's Harter Act
defenses is Schnell v. The Vallescura.111 A cargo of onions was
shipped from Spain to New York but on arrival was found to be
spoiled. The cargo holds had not been ventilated during the twenty-
three day voyage.
The carrier defended on the basis of peril of the sea because the
ship had experienced heavy weather on several days. There were a
number of days of fair weather, however, when the cargo might have
been ventilated but was not, for which the carrier claimed the
10 1d. at 345.
1°1Id. at 348.
'Id. at 352.
"
0
°See The W. W. Bruce, 94 F.2d 834, 1938 AMC 232 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 567
(1938); Horn v. Compania de Navegacion Fruco, 404 F.2d 422, 1968 AMC 2548 (5th Cir. 1968);
and C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. M/V Hans Leonhardt, 719 F. Supp. 479, 1990 AMC 733 (E.D.
La. 1989).
11293 U.S. 296 (1934).
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negligent management defense. The Supreme Court rejected the
negligent management argument, noting that the statutory defense is
negligent management of the vessel, not negligent management of the
cargo. 12 Thus, the question became one of the burden of proof of the
peril of the sea.
The Second Circuit had held that the cargo interest had to prove
what portion of the goods was spoiled by the failure to ventilate on
good days. 1 3 This difficult burden-to show "onion by onion" which
onion spoiled during good weather and which onion spoiled during
heavy weather-was turned around by the Supreme Court and
became the carrier's burden of apportionment. The explanation for
reversing the Second Circuit was public policy, as in The Isis. " 4 The
public policy is not described but is presumed to be that underlying
the Harter Act. The language of the Court comes after a lengthy
review of Harter Act cases:
In each of these cases the carrier is charged with the responsibility for
loss which, in fact, may not be due to his fault, merely because the law,
in pursuance of a wise policy, casts on him the burden of showing facts
relieving him from liability.' 15
The exact holding of Schnell v. The Vallescura has been preserved
in the Hamburg Rules." 6
B. Filling in the Gaps in Harter Act Coverage
A number of problems, for which solutions have been given in
more modern conventions, were not covered in the Harter Act.
Nevertheless, as is discussed below, solutions were developed by the
courts on the basis of the policy and general language of the Harter
Act and carrier clauses in bills of lading.
1121d. at 303.
11370 F.2d 261, 1934 AMC 573 (2d Cir. 1934).
114The Isis, supra note 103. The rationale for the bailee status is that discharge of the duty
is "peculiarly within his control, and all facts upon which he may rely to relieve him of that duty
are peculiarly within his knowledge, and unknown to the shipper." Schnell, 293 U.S. at 304.
'"1Id. at 307.
116Art. 5(7) of the Hamburg Rules provides:
Where fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents combines with
another cause to produce loss, damage or delay in delivery the carrier is liable only to the
extent that the loss, damage or delay in delivery is attributable to such fault or neglect,
provided that the carrier proves the amount of the loss, damage or delay in delivery not
attributable thereto.
January 1993
26 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
1. The Charter Party Exclusion
The Senate version of the Harter Act eliminated two references to
"common carriers" contained in the House version. Thus, the statute
does not distinguish common carriage from private carriage. In the
first sentence of Sections One and Two, the statutory language is
"any bill of lading or shipping document." 117 This would appear to
make the Harter Act apply to both private and common carriage,
since "bills of lading" can be issued by owners or charterers and a
charter party is certainly a "shipping document." Furthermore,
Section Three immunizes the "vessel, her owner or owners, agent, or
charterers." 18 On the other hand, the end of Section One speaks of
"bills of lading or shipping receipts," from which it might be argued
that bills of lading issued under charter parties were intended to be
excluded unless serving as a receipt for the goods.
Thus, a literal reading does not determine whether the Harter Act
is to apply to charter parties in private carriage. At best, the language
is ambiguous. To the Second Circuit, however, it seemed clear that
Congress was legislating only with respect to common carriers and
their bills of lading since charterers of the "whole reach" of an entire
ship could be presumed to be bargaining at arms' length with the
owners.' 19 Other circuits have followed this view.120
COGSA excludes charter parties, but not bills of lading issued
under charter parties, both in a direct exclusion' 2' and indirectly in
the definition of contract of carriage. 122 The effect of COGSA
decisions, therefore, is to conform both statutes as inapplicable to
private carriage under charter parties.123
2. The Time Bar
Since there is no statutory time bar in the Haiter Act, it can be
assumed that the admiralty doctrine of laches applies. Thus, the
"46 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 190, 191 (1988).
...Id. at § 192.
"
9The Fri, 154 F. 333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 210 U.S. 431 (1907); The G.R. Crowe, 294 E
506 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 586 (1923); Koppers Connecticut Coke Co. v. James
McWilliams Blue Line, 89 F.2d 865, 1937 AMC 719 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 706 (1937);
and In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 1972 AMC 1122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
982 (1972). See also Golcar Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Tweedie Trading Co., 146 F. 573 (S.D.N.Y.
1906).
12°See Kerr McGee Corp. v. Law, 479 F.2d 61, 1973 AMC 1667 (4th Cir. 1973), and The
Monarch of Nassau, 155 F.2d 48, 1946 AMC 853 (5th Cir. 1946).
12146 U.S.C. Appx. § 1305 (1988).
122 1d. at § 1301(4).
123See Marine Sulphur Queen, supra note 119, and Kerr McGee, supra note 120.
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claimant loses the right to bring a stale claim when the passage of time
has prejudiced the defendant's ability to defend the claim because of
missing witnesses or documents. 24 Shipowners, however, attempted
to resolve the problem of stale claims by clauses in the bill of lading
fixing a time bar absolutely 125 or after notice of damage had been
given. 126
The issue for the courts is the reasonableness of the time bar under
the circumstances. Both thirty days 127 and six months 128 have been
found to be unreasonable, as has a fifteen-day notice precondition to
suit.129 A one-year time bar clause is inherently reasonable, however,
since it is the same as the time bar in COGSA. 130
3. The Unit Limitation of Liability: Agreed Valuation Clauses
Since the House bill's language forbidding limitation of liability was
dropped by the Senate, there is no statutory limit in the Harter Act
similar to the $500 per package limit of COGSA. Unit limitation
concepts were well-known in the shipping industry, however, since a
unit limitation of £100 per package was used in the 1882 Liverpool
Conference form bill of lading. 13' The initial view of the Supreme
124 See generally Gardner v. Panama Railroad Co., 342 U.S. 29, 1951 AMC 2048 (1951). See
also Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984).
125J. Aron & Co. v. Askvin, 267 F.2d 276, 1960 AMC 314 (2d Cir. 1959). See also J. Aron &
Co. v. Panama Railroad Co., 255 N.Y. 513, 175 N.E. 273, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 635 (1932).
126 Lagerloef Trading Co. v. United States, 43 F.2d 871, 1930 AMC 1163 (2d Cir. 1930) (one
year time for suit clause upheld).
127Gelderman v. Dollar Steamship Line, 41 F.2d 398, 1923 AMC 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
128Armour & Co. A/S v. Gjeruldsen, 15 F.2d 53, 1926 AMC 1614 (4th Cir. 1926).
129 Delaware Steel Co. v. Calmar Steamship Co., 378 F.2d 386, 1968 AMC 1527 (3d Cir.
1967).
130The one year time bar in COGSA is found at 46 U.S.C. Appx. § 1303(6) (fifth sentence).
Dissatisfaction with the one year period in the conditions of modem containerized transport has
caused a change to a two-year time bar in the Hamburg Rules (Art. 20), the Multimodal
Convention (Art. 25), and the O.T.T. Convention (Art. 12).
Despite vigorous British opposition to the two-year time bar in these conventions, it should
be noted that in 1950, in the British Hague Rules Agreement between cargo insurers and P&I
clubs, the time bar was extended to two years and the unit limitation to £200. See Knauth, supra
note 12, at 471-75. The 1977 version contains a two-year time bar and a unit limitation of £400.
See Tetley, supra note 4, at 1235.
13 1Knauth, supra note 12, at 119. The 1882 Liverpool Conference form bill of lading is
reprinted in 2 The Legislative History of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the Travaux
Pr~paratoires of the Hague Rules 61-64 (M. Sturley ed. 1990) (hereinafter Legislative History).
For a discussion of the Liverpool Conference and the Conference form, see History of COGSA,
supra note 104, at 6-8. For a discussion of earlier antecedents to the unit limitation concept, see
Sturley, The Fair Opportunity Requirement Under COGSA Section 4(5): A Case Study in the
Misinterpretation of the Carriageof Goods by Sea Act, 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1, 28-29 (1988)
(hereinafter Fair Opportunity).
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Court was that unit limitation clauses were flatly prohibited by the
Harter Act. 132 Subsequently, however, the Court reconsidered the
question in light of the practice in the railroad industry.133
The issue then became one of the reasonableness of the amount of
the limitation. Later cases introduced the requirement for a negotia-
tion whereby each side gave up a "consideration," as, for example,
the carrier collecting higher freight for greater liability. 134 Still later
132 In Calderon, supra note 68, a clause limiting shipper recovery to $100 per package was
found to be invalid on the ground that it was in direct contravention of the language of Section
One.
133The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263 (1902), dealt with passenger luggage. Although the Harter
Act does not directly cover luggage, it can be made to apply by means of a provision in the
ticket by which a shipowner would be responsible according to the terms of the shipowner's bill
of lading.
In The Kensington, the passage ticket had exculpatory provisions, which were held to be
void as against public policy, and a limitation of liability clause for injury to the passenger's
baggage "beyond the sum of 250 francs at which such baggage is hereby valued." In the view
of the Court, the passenger had no recourse beyond 250 francs (about US $50) for damaged
baggage unless he agreed to have the baggage treated as cargo and subject to a bill of lading
under the Harter Act with its defenses of negligent navigation and management. The Court's
conclusion was "the arbitrary limitation of 250 francs to each passenger, unaccompanied by a
right to increase the amount by an adequate and reasonable proportional payment, was void."
Id. at 277.
In the railroad industry, Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331 (1884), had upheld a limit
of liability of $200 per horse applied to a claim of $19,800 for the death of a race horse and injury
to four others. See Goddard, The Liability of the Common Carrier as Determined by Recent
Decisions of the Supreme Court, 15 Colum. L. Rev. 399 (1915). Thus, unit limitation, otherwise
void for arbitrarily relieving carrier liability, could be valid in maritime law, as in railroad law,
where a higher valuation of the cargo was possible in exchange for a proportionately higher ad
valorem freight rate. Subsequent cases upheld the railroad figure of $100 per package unit
limitation. See Hohl v. Norddeutscher Lloyd, 175 F. 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 216 U.S. 621
(1910); Reid v. Fargo, 241 U.S. 544 (1916); The Caledonia, 31 F.2d 257, 1929 AMC 725 (2d Cir.
1929); and The Ansaldo San Giorgio I, 294 U.S. 494, 1935 AMC 419 (1935) (clause unreasonable
which exonerated carrier if undamaged portion of shipment is worth more at destination than
whole cargo's value at shipment; invalid clause contrasted with "true" limitation agreements
where higher freight rate applies to higher valuations). In addition, limits calculated in a foreign
currency also have been upheld. See, e.g., Kuhnhold v. Cie. Generale Transatlantique, 251 F.
384 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (1000 francs per package, pro rata); Koan Maru, 252 F. 384 (S.D.N.Y.
1917) (f50 per freight ton); and Miller Yacht Co. v. M/V Vishva Shobha, 1981 AMC 2479
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (£100 under the Indian version of the Hague Rules). Approval also has been
given to a clause limiting recovery to net invoice cost plus disbursements. The Ferncliff, 306
U.S. 444, 1939 AMC 403 (1939).
134See Reid v. Fargo, 241 U.S. 544 (1916), and Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U.S.
317 (1921). See also Stevens v. Cunard S.S. Co., 271 F. 306 (2d Cir. 1921); Toyo Kisen
Kabushiki Kaisha v. Willits & Co., 17 F.2d 762, 1927 AMC 511 (9th Cir. 1927); Transmarine
Corp. v. Charles H. Levitt & Co., 25 F.2d 275, 1928 AMC 682 (2d Cir. 1928); Caribbean
Produce Exchange, Inc. v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 88 (D.P.R. 1976); and Antilles
Ins. Co. v. Transconex, Inc., 862 F.2d 391, 1989 AMC 984 (1st Cir. 1988), overturning 672 F.
Supp. 61, 1988 AMC 1250 (D.P.R. 1987).
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cases introduced the "fair opportunity" doctrine, under which the
carrier must notify the shipper of the alternate rates in order to take
advantage of the unit limitation in the bill of lading. 135
IV.
THE EFFECT OF COGSA ON THE HARTER ACT
A. Background of COGSA
1. The International Consequences of the Harter Act
During the first quarter of this century the International Law
Association ("ILA"),136 and its unofficial descendant, the Comitd
Maritime International ("CMI'),137 continued to be interested in the
Clauses also have been held invalid because there was no provision for a rate reduction for
decreased liability. See A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Cie. Generale Transatlantique, 12 F.2d
83, 1926 AMC 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1926), aft'd, 18 F.2d 930, 1927 AMC 773 (2d Cir. 1927), cert.
denied, 274 U.S. 761 (1927); Transmarine Corp. v. Charles H. Levitt & Co., 25 F.2d 275, 1928
AMC 682 (2d Cir. 1928). Similarly, clauses that do not have a provision for increasing the freight
rate to achieve higher unit valuation have been struck down. See Venezuelan Meat Export Co.
v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 379, 1935 AMC 1481 (D. Md. 1935).
135Gold Medal Trading Corp. v. Atlantic Overseas Corp., 580 F. Supp. 610, 1984 AMC 2052
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also Federal Insurance Co. v. Transconex, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 290 (D.P.R.
1976), and Nemcik v. Olympo Transport Co. of Puerto Rico, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 20 (D.P.R.
1991).
In this regard, one also should review Fair Opportunity, supra note 131, wherein the author
criticizes the courts' failure to research the international background and legislative history
before promulgating such legislative-type decisions as Tessler Bros. (B.C.) v. Italpacific Line,
494 F.2d 438, 1974 AMC 937 (9th Cir. 1974); Pan Am World Airways v. California Stevedore &
Ballast Co., 559 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1977); Brown & Root, Inc. v. M/V Peisander, 648 F.2d 415,
1982 AMC 929 (5th Cir. 1981); and General Electric Co. v. M/V Nedlloyd, 817 F.2d 1022, 1987
AMC 1817 (2d Cir. 1987).136The ILA was founded in Brussels in October 1873. Created in the aftermath of the
American Civil War (1861-65) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), it was intended to
reform and codify the law of nations. Its legal expertise came from David Dudley Field
(1805-94), who codified New York's common law and who, through his brother, Stephen J.
Field (1816-99), exerted a powerful influence on California's codes. The younger Field served
as the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court (1859-63) and as an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court (1863-97). The ILA conducts studies and makes reports at its
biennial conferences on all aspects of public and private international law. In maritime law, the
ILA produced the York-Antwerp Rules on General Average in 1877 and the Hague Rules on
Bills of Lading in 1921. See generally Olmstead, The International Law Association: A
Worldwide Organization for Development and Promotion of International Law, in The Present
State of International Law 1 (M. Bos. ed. 1973).137The CMI grew out of the ILA in 1896. Organized by national groups of lawyers and
insurers specializing in maritime affairs, it has devoted special efforts to harmonizing Anglo-
American common law thinking with the civil law principles of codified law on the European
continent. A Belgian lawyer, Louis Franck (1868-1937), was most instrumental in its early
development. The organization is today made up of some four dozen national associations. Its
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question of uniform bill of lading clauses with uniform interpretation.
These efforts eventually produced, in September 1921, the voluntary
Hague Rules, 38 and later, the 1924 Brussels international conven-
tion. 139
In the early years, the example of the Harter Act was followed in
the legislation of certain British dominions that were large exporters
of raw materials. These countries believed shippers were not being
fairly treated by carrier interests in the mother country. New
Zealand, then a colony, enacted in 1903 the first statute modeled on
the Harter Act. 140 The new nation of Australia' 4' enacted its own Sea
Carriage of Goods Act in 1904,142 followed by Canada in the Water
principal work is the study of maritime problems of a commercial nature and the production of
reports with agreed solutions thereto. In an earlier time, the organization was concerned
exclusively with the preparation of international conventions for diplomatic conferences
convened by the Belgian government. Thirteen of these diplomatic conferences were held from
1910 to 1979, producing international conventions on Collision (1910), Salvage (1910), Limita-
tion of Shipowners' Liability (1924), Bills of Lading (1924), Maritime Liens and Mortgages
(1926), Immunity of State-Owned Ships (1926), Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision (1952),
Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision (1952), Arrest of Sea-Going Ships (1952), Limitation
of Liability of Shipowners (1957), Stowaways (1957), Passengers (1961), Nuclear Ship Opera-
tors (1962), Vessels Under Construction (1967), Passenger Luggage (1967), The Visby Amend-
ments to the Hague Rules (1968), and The SDR Protocol to the Hague Rules (1979). (The author
represented the United States at the 1979 Diplomatic Conference.) Since 1972, the organization
has worked closely with the International Maritime Organization, the International Labour
Organization, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. It also has
prepared commercial solutions to problems that do not require intergovernmental agreements
to be effective. In 1992, its purposes were changed to permit the organization to extend its
activities to those maritime activities traditionally regarded as parts of public law. See generally
A. Lilar & C. Van Den Bosch, Le Comitd Maritime International (1972); Sweeney, Proportional
Fault in Both to Blame Collisions, in Studi in Onore di Giorgio Berlingieri 549 (spec. ed. II
Diritto Marittimo 1964); Chauveau, L'Unification du Droit Maritime et le C.M.I., 1963 Rev.
Trim. de Droit Commercial 737; and E. Gold, Maritime Transport: The Evolution of Interna-
tional Marine Policy and Shipping Law 128 (1981).
138The Hague Rules of 1921, 1923 AMC 63, reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note
131, at 335-41. See generally History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 18-25.
139International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 157 (the original text is in French only). See English
translation at 51 Stat. 247, 1 Legislative History, supra note 131, at 573-81. See generally
History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 25-32.
14(1903) Acts No. 96. The 1903 legislation was superseded by the New Zealand Shipping and
Seamen Act, 1908, Acts No. 178. The 1908 Act was superseded by (1940) Acts No. 31 (enacting
Hague Rules). New Zealand had advanced from the status of "colony" to "dominion" in 1907.
14The Commonwealth of Australia, comprising the British colonies of New South Wales,
Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia, and Queensland, came into existence
on January 1, 1901, following twenty years of discussion of federation. See generally History of
COGSA, supra note 104, at 15, 35-36 (discussing the history of the Australian acts).
1423 Commonwealth Acts, 37. The 1904 legislation was superseded in 1924 by domestic
legislation adopting the Hague Rules. See Sea Carriage of Goods Act, Acts of 1924, No. 22. A
significant provision in the 1904 statute rendered invalid all bill of lading clauses that ousted the
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Carriage of Goods Act of 1910.143 Since arguments based on freedom
of contract in the imperial setting had been unable to contain
legislation similar to the Harter Act in the British Empire, it was clear
that from a global viewpoint uniformity might be attained only
through international legislation in the treaty process.
The ILA considered a resolution at a conference in Oslo (then
Christiania) in 1905 that would have applied to the shipowner-
charterer relation the Harter Act method of invalidating clauses
relieving shipowners from negligence liabilities or lessening the duties
respecting seaworthiness. 144 The resolution was defeated by a vote of
13 to 12 in 1905 and reconsidered inconclusively in Berlin in 1906.145
In the background of these discussions were the efforts of cargo
insurers to avoid coverage of shipper claims for shipowner negli-
gence 146 and the efforts of the carriers' P&I clubs 147 similarly to avoid
coverage of shipowner negligence by failing to reimburse members
who did not use the prescribed exculpatory clauses to defeat ship-
pers' claims of negligence.
The subject of "international regulation of foreign bills of lading"
was raised ineffectively in the CMI by the Maritime Law Association
of the United States ("MLA") in 1912. It would not resurface until
after the "voluntary" clauses for bills of lading had been prepared in
1921 by the ILA and the British Maritime Law Association. The
jurisdiction of Australian courts both as to import and export bills (Sec. 6). Section 9, Acts of
1924, No. 22, preserves this provision in the Hague Rules context. Cf. 46 U.S.C. Appx. §
1303(8) (1988), and see supra note 39. See generally History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 15-16
(discussing the history of the New Zealand and Australian acts).
1439 & 10 Edw. 7, c. 61, R.S. Canada ch. 207 (1927). The abolition of the continuing warranty
of seaworthiness, implied in the Harter Act, is made clear in § 3 of this Act: "There shall not
be implied in any contract for the carriage of goods by water to which the Rules apply any
absolute undertaking by the carrier of the goods to provide a seaworthy ship." Section 5
rendered invalid bill of lading clauses that ousted the jurisdiction of Canadian courts at the port
of loading, in addition to the requirement of a Canadian clause paramount at such port. Section
8 added a unit limitation of carrier liability fixed at $100 per package, unless a higher value was
stated.
The 1910 legislation was superseded by the 1936 Water Carriage of Goods Act, I Edw. 8 ch.
49 (effective Aug. 1, 1936), which adopted, as a schedule, the English translation of the French
original of the Hague Rules from the 1924 British Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. See Tetley,
supra note 4, at 4-6, 1016-18. See generally History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 16-17, 56
(discussing the history of the Canadian acts).
144Knauth, supra note 12, at 122-25. See also Sieveking, The Harter Act and Bills of Lading
Legislation, 16 Yale L.J. 25, 26 (1906).
145The casting vote of the chair broke the 12-12 tie. Id. at 26. See also History of COGSA,
supra note 104, at 8-9 n.52.
146Knauth, supra note 12, at 123.
147Sieveking, supra note 144, at 27.
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international legislation called the Hague Rules was then promoted by
the International Chamber of Commerce and the CMI. 148
2. The Spirit of the Harter Act in the Hague Rules
The diplomatic conferences that transformed the voluntary Hague
Rules of 1921 into mandatory form were concluded in August 1924 in
Brussels in a conference attended by twenty-six nations.149 The part
played by the Harter Act in these negotiations proved to be indirect,
as the influence of shippers proved to be slight-merely the idea of
the compromise that the carriers would have the policy-based de-
fenses of negligent navigation and management' 50 in exchange for the
carriers' obligation to exercise due diligence in making the ship
seaworthy. 51 Shippers' control over the invention of new clauses
exculpating carriers in bills of lading remained in Article 111(8), but
without the spotlight given by Sections One and Two of the Harter
Act.
Aside from this spirit of the Harter Act, the Hague Rules are
different in form and interpretation from the Harter Act, in that much
of the new language comes from bill of lading exculpatory clauses that
provide the carrier with seventeen defenses that are applicable where
something other than the unseaworthy condition of the ship causes
the damage. 52
How much this new concept in the Hague Rules differed from the
American viewpoint is clearly shown by the long list of changes made
by the United States Congress to the Hague Rules under the guise of
a "clarification" in 1936 at the time of the enactment of COGSA.153
148Knauth, supra note 12, at 123. See generally History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 18-25.149For a thorough review of the drafting history see History of COGSA, supra note 104. See
also R. Colinvaux, The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, 1-9 (1954), and Knauth, supra note
12, at 124-27.
150Knauth, supra note 12, at 127-28.
15146 U.S.C. Appx. § 192 (1988), contrasted with 46 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 190 and 191 (1988). See
supra notes 11-14.
152Hague Rules, Art. IV(2)(a)-(q), where unseaworthiness is raised by the plaintiff, Art.
IV(I) provides "the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier
153Differences between the United States statute and the treaty are as follows:
1. Article 3, § 2, U.S. COGSA omits "Subject to the provision of Art. 4."
2. Article 3, § 4, U.S. COGSA adds "Provided that nothing in this chapter shall be
construed as repealing or limiting the application of any part [of the Pomerene Act on
Bills of Lading].-
3. Article 3, § 6, U.S. COGSA adds "Provided that if a notice of loss or damage; either
apparent or concealed, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not
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The meaning of that clarification is most vividly seen in the United
States' deletion of the reference to the list of defenses in the
statement of the carrier's Article 111(2) obligation to "properly and
carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the
goods."' 54 While the congressional record may be sparse, it is
certainly arguable that Congress thereby reaffirmed the language and
spirit of the Harter Act where Section One speaks of "proper loading,
stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery" of the goods. 1 55 Congress
affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered."
4. Article 4, § 2(j), "Strikes," U.S. COGSA adds "Provided, that nothing herein
contained shall be construed to relieve a carrier from responsibility for the carrier's
own acts."
5. Article 4, § 4, "Deviations," U.S. COGSA adds "Provided, however, that if the
deviation is for the purpose of loading or unloading cargo or passengers, it shall, prima
facie, be regarded as unreasonable."
6. Article 4, § 5, "Amount of liability," U.S. COGSA rephrases the treaty provision
deleting the phrase "per package or unit" and replaces it with "per package lawful
money of the United States, or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per
customary freight unit." The treaty figure "100 pounds sterling" is replaced by
"$500" and the expression "transportation of" is inserted between "in connexion
with ... goods" at the beginning and again in the third paragraph at the same place.
U.S. COGSA also adds the sentence "In no event shall the carrier be liable for more
than the amount of damage actually sustained."
7. Article 8, U.S. COGSA substitutes citation of the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act, 46
U.S.C., §§ 175, 181-183, 183b-188 and the Shipping Act of 1916.
8. U.S. COGSA § 1309 adds provision prohibiting discrimination between competing
shippers.
9. Article 9 has been deleted in its entirety [Gold Value and Pounds Sterling and Rate of
Exchange].
10. Article 10, applying the treaty provision to bills of lading issued in any of the
contracting states, is entirely deleted and replaced by U.S. COGSA § 1312 applying
the statute to "all contracts of carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United
States in foreign trade ...."
11. U.S. COGSA § 1311 specifically preserves the Harter Act for the "before" and
"after" periods in international trade and permits U.S. COGSA as contractual
provision in domestic trade.
12. Articles 11-16 (The Final Clauses concerning ratification, adhesion, and denunciation)
are deleted from U.S. COGSA, but a provision for suspension in retaliation for
discriminatory application is added.
154 1n the treaty, Article 111(2) of the Hague Rules provides: "Le transporteur, sous rdserve
des dispositions de I' article 4, procdera de faqon apropride et soigneuse au chargement, A la
manutention, A l'arrimage, au transport, A la garde, aux soins et du d~chargement des
marchandises transportdes." The English statutory formula provides: "Subject to the provi-
sions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care
for and discharge the goods carried." COGSA simply provides: "The carrier shall properly and
carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried." 46 U.S.C.
Appx. § 1303(2) (1988).
15546 U.S.C. Appx. § 190 (1988).
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would not permit this clear obligation to be "frittered away" by the
catalogue of seventeen defenses in Article IV(2)(a)-(q).
The foregoing is not meant to disparage the work of Judge Charles
M. Hough 156 of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, who
presided over the penultimate drafting of the mandatory rules in
Brussels in 1922. As president of the MLA, Judge Hough was
well-known in CMI circles and clearly understood what was neces-
sary to achieve an international agreement.
The text of the mandatory Hague Rules in its French original was
adopted on August 25, 1924, and signed,157 subject to ratification, by
fourteen nations, including the United States.158 Thereafter, the
international convention came into force on June 2, 1931, one year
after the deposit of four ratifications (Belgium, Hungary, Spain, and
the United Kingdom), with the Belgian government acting as depos-
itary.159 The British government had enacted domestic legislation
putting the Hague Rules in force even before the conclusion of the
diplomatic conference,1 60 a clear precedent for what the United
States would do in 1936 to formulate the treaty language in its own
image.
B. The Hague Rules and COGSA
Opposition in the United States to the new international agreement
from cargo-owning interests surfaced prior to its final conclusion by
a proposal in 1923 to amend the Harter Act to restore the continuing
nature of the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness by striking out
the requirement to exercise due diligence to make the ship seawor-
thy. 161 This proposed reform of the Harter Act was hurt by the
156Charles M. Hough (1858-1927) practiced in Philadelphia and New York before his
appointment as a federal district judge. After serving on the Southern District of New York for
ten years (1906-16), he was appointed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (1916-27). See
History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 29-30.
157See Knauth, supra note 12, at 127-28, and History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 32.
158International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading, 120 L.N.T.S. 155. The English language text is in 51 Stat. 233, and I Legislative
History, supra note 131, at 573-81.
159CMI Documentation, 1989-90 Y.B. at 88-94.
l6°Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22 (1924). See generally History of
COGSA, supra note 104, at 32-35.
16 1See History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 38-42, and Knauth, supra note 12, at 128. S.
427, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., was introduced by Senator Kenneth D. McKellar (D-Tennessee) on
December 6, 1923. Senator McKellar regularly reintroduced this legislation and was to continue
his opposition to what he regarded as pro-carrier changes in the law in 1935.
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Supreme Court's decision in The Jsis162 in 1933, which endorsed
carrier liability for cargo damage based on non-causal unseaworthi-
ness, and it is arguable that the uncertainties created by that decision
may have led to United States' acceptance of the Hague Rules,
although with substantial differences. 63
The Hague Rules treaty was referred by President Calvin Coolidge
to the Senate for advice and consent on February 26, 1927.164
Although hearings were held by the Foreign Relations Committee in
December 1927, action by the full Senate did not occur for eight
years. Finally, in March 1935, the Foreign Relations Committee
reported favorably on the treaty. 65 A short time later, on April 1,
1935, the Senate gave its advice and consent. 66 Four months later,
the Senate passed domestic legislation and referred it to the House of
Representatives, where hearings were held in January 1936.167 The
basis of this domestic legislation was the 1924 treaty with amend-
ments favored by shipper interests in the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States. 68
The "clarified" text, based on the Hague Rules, was approved by
the House of Representatives on April 6, 1936. As in the Senate, there
was no recorded vote. 69 President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the
United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act on April 16, 1936. It
162The Isis, supra note 103.
163See supra note 153. See History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 52, and Knauth, supra note
12, at 129, 138.
'"See Knauth, supra note 12, at 128-31. See also Executive E, 69th Cong. Second Sess.
(1927), and Transmittal Letter from Pres. Calvin Coolidge to the Senate, 69 Cong. Rec. 5175-76
(1928), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 131, at 561.
165History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 54-55. See Ex. Rep. No. 2, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, supra note 131, at 508-21. The 1927 hearing is
reprinted id. at 323-64.
16679 Cong. Rec. 4758 (1935), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 131, at 586. See
also History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 54-55.
167The 1935 Senate hearing on the domestic legislation is reprinted in 3 Legislative History,
supra note 131, at 499-593. See also S. Rep. No. 742, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in
1 Legislative History, supra note 131, at 531-35. For the Senate passage of the bill, see 79 Cong.
Rec. 13343 (1935), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 131, at 594. The 1936 House
hearings are reprinted in 3 Legislative History, supra note 131, at 595-743, and the House
committee report (H.R. Rep. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936)) is reprinted in I Legislative
History, supra note 131, at 521-29. See generally History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 53-55.
'6See History of COGSA, supra note 104, at 48-51, and Knauth, supra note 12, at 128-29.
See also Uniform Ocean Bills of Lading Act, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Apr.
1931.
16980 Cong. Rec. 5026 (1936), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 131, at 600. The
Senate's approval of a technical House amendment is in 80 Cong. Rec. 5070 (1936), reprinted
in I Legislative History, supra note 131, at 600.
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became effective three months later. 70 Like the Harter Act, this
statute has not been amended in any way. Because of the many
differences between the legislative text and the treaty, resubmission
of the treaty for advice and consent was considered necessary. The
treaty text, subject to two understandings (or reservations), was
given Senate advice and consent on May 6, 1937, and was ratified by
a presidential proclamation on May 25, 1937.171 The United States'
ratification was deposited with the Belgian government on June 29,
1937, to be effective as a treaty instrument six months later on
December 29, 1937.172
At this time, international law doctrine on the subject of reserva-
tions to treaties was in the process of change due to the development
of multilateral conventions. The general view, however, was that
ratifications subject to reservations were not effective if signatories to
the treaty objected to the reservation, but positive acceptance of the
reservation was not necessary.1 73 In fact, no objections to the United
States' reservations were made.
V.
VITALITY OF THE HARTER ACT: ITS INTERACTION
WITH COGSA
COGSA specifically preserves the Harter Act in general terms, as
well as more specifically in its applicability "prior to the time when
the goods are loaded on or after the time they are discharged from the
ship."' 174 Nevertheless, COGSA applies to "all contracts for carriage
of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign
trade," 175 but it does not apply in United States domestic trade unless
there is "an express statement that it shall be subject to the provision
of this Act, ' ' 176 in which case the bill of lading will be "subjected
17Pub. L. No. 521, 74th Cong. (S. 1152), 49 Stat. 1207-13, codified at 46 U.S.C. Appx. §§
1300-15 (1988).
17149 Stat. 1207. For Senate consideration of the additional understanding, see 81 Cong. Rec.
4254-55 (1937), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 131, at 602-03.
172Deposit of Ratification, 51 Stat. 260 (1937). See also CMI Y.B., supra note 159, at 91-92,
for ratifications and accessions.
173See generally K. Holloway, Modem Trends in Treaty Law: Constitutional Law, Reser-
vation and the Three Modes of Legislation (1967).
17446 U.S.C. Appx. § 1311 (1988). See Allstate Insurance Co. v. International Shipping
Corp., 703 F.2d 497, 1985 AMC 760 (11th Cir. 1983) (the incorporation of COGSA by reference
cannot bring the COGSA one-year time bar into force for the Harter Act period because 46
U.S.C. Appx. § 1311 (1988) preserves the Harter Act for the before and after periods).
17546 U.S.C. Appx. § 1312 (1988) (first three sentences).
176Id. (fourth sentence).
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hereto as fully as if subject hereto by the express provisions of this
Act."' 177 Lastly, while both acts exclude live animals, only COGSA
excludes deck cargo.178 In cases where there may be a difference in
the standard of liability between the Harter Act period of coverage
and the COGSA period of coverage, the burden of apportioning the
damage between the two statutes, usually an impossible burden, is
placed on the carrier. 179
A. Application of COGSA "Ex Proprio Vigore" in the
Harter Period
1. International Trade
The Halter Act applies from the moment that the goods are taken
in charge by the carrier-wherever that may be180-until the goods
are properly delivered.18' Out of that total period, COGSA will apply
to the period from loading until unloading on the international
voyage, unless COGSA itself says it does not apply because the
goods have been loaded on deck 8 2 or the goods have been damaged
before the COGSA period or after the COGSA period.183 The
177Id.
1781d. at § 1301(1)(c).
179 Philip Morris v. American Shipping Co., 748 F.2d 563, 1986 AMC 276 (1lth Cir. 1984). See
also Armco International Corp. v. Rederi A/B Disa (The Astri), 151 F.2d 5, 1945 AMC 1064 (2d
Cir. 1945).
18°See Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., 562 F.2d 938, 1978 AMC 370
(5th Cir. 1977).
l8 IThe Monte Iciar, 167 F.2d 334, 1948 AMC 615 (3d Cir. 1947); Allstate Insurance, supra
note 174; and R.L. Pritchard & Co. v. S.S. Hellenic Laurel, 342 F. Supp. 388, 1972 AMC 1534
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
The Harter Act's duty to care for cargo at the time of proper delivery can be illustrated by
two cases involving cargoes unloaded in the Port of New York. In Monsieur Henri Wines v.
S.S. Covadonga, 1965 AMC 740 (D.N.J. 1964), wine and cider were stored by the carrier in an
unheated warehouse in January, causing the carrier to be found liable. In contrast, in Italusa
Corp. v. M/V Thalassini Kyra, 733 F. Supp. 209, 1990 AMC 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), cheese was
stored in an unrefrigerated warehouse during a June heatwave. The carrier was found not to be
liable, however, because no information had been made available to it with respect to the need
for refrigeration.182 Levatino Co. v. S.S. Hellenic Hero, 1969 AMC 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Z.K.
Marine, Inc. v. M/V Archigetis, 1991 AMC 1434 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (where COGSA was applied
to the Harter Act on deck cargo by a clause incorporating the Hague Rules), and Blanchard
Lumber Co. v. S.S. Anthony II, supra note 14. The Z.K. Marine case is commented upon in
Jarvis, Admiralty, 16 Nova L. Rev. 127, 136-38 (1991).
183Armco International Corp. v. Rederi A/B Disa, 151 F.2d 5, 1945 AMC 1064 (2d Cir. 1945);
Norjac Trading Corp. v. MV Mathilda Thorden, 173 F. Supp. 23, 1959 AMC 1831 (E.D. Pa.
1959); and Tapco Nigeria, Ltd. v. MV Westwind, 702 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1983).
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differences between COGSA and the Harter Act as to time bar' 84 and
unit limitation are obvious. 8 5 Respecting exculpatory clauses, how-
ever, the problem is more complex. Under Article 3(8) of COGSA,
exculpatory clauses that lessen the carrier's liability under COGSA
are null and void, 186 whereas the Harter Act makes null and void
clauses that relieve the carrier's negligence liability 8 7 or lessen its
due diligence obligation to make the vessel seaworthy.18 8 Thus,
clauses that might survive COGSA scrutiny could fail the stricter
scrutiny of the Harter Act. 89
The attitude of the courts is that the parties are unable to stipulate
the application of COGSA generally to a period or method of Harter
Act coverage when COGSA specifically excludes it.190 Thus, some-
'84One year in COGSA, 46 U.S.C. Appx. § 1303(6) (1988) (fourth paragraph); no limit in the
Harter Act (presumably laches will apply).
185$500 per package for packageable goods, 46 U.S.C. Appx. § 1304(5) (1988) (first paragraph
in COGSA); no unit limitation in the Harter Act. But see supra notes 131-35.
'
86David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 339 F.2d 295, 1965 AMC 39 (2d Cir. 1964),
and Encyclopedia Brittanica v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 1969 AMC 174 (2d Cir.
1969).
'
87The Orcadian, 116 F. 930 (E.D. Pa. 1902); Stockton Milling Co. v. California Nay. & Imp.
Co., 184 F. 369 (9th Cir. 1908); The Isla de Panay, 292 F. 723 (2d Cir.), aft'd, 267 U.S. 260
(1923); Mackey v. United States, 197 F.2d 241, 1952 AMC 1094 (2d Cir. 1952); Isthmian S.S.
Co. v. California Spray Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 41, 1962 AMC 1474 (9th Cir. 1962); Caterpillar
Overseas, S.A. v. S.S. Expeditor, 318 F.2d 720, 1963 AMC 1662 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 942 (1963); and Allied Chemical International Corp. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd
Brasileiro, 775 F.2d 476, 1986 AMC 827 (2d Cir. 1985).188Carib Prince, supra note 64. See supra notes 64-69. Cf. The Caledonia, supra note 58
(facts occurred before enactment of the Harter Act and the Court relied on an implied warranty
of seaworthiness).
'
89Remington Rand Inc. v. American Export Lines (The Examiner), 132 F. Supp. 129, 1955
AMC 1789 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (discharge into ighters at Bombay; neither COGSA nor the fire
statute applicable); David Crystal, supra note 186; R.L. Pritchard, supra note 181; Seald-Sweet
Sales v. Finnlines Oy, 1974 AMC 2006 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); B. Elliott (Canada) Ltd. v. John T.
Clark & Son, 542 F. Supp. 1367, 1983 AMC 1392 (D. Md. 1982), aft'd, 704 F.2d 1305, 1983 AMC
1743 (4th Cir. 1983); Allstate Insurance, supra note 174; Sklut Hide & Furs v. Prudential Lines,
537 F. Supp. 266, 1986 AMC 960 (D. Del. 1982); Vistar, S.A. v. M/V Sea Land Express, 792
F.2d 469, 1986 AMC 2382 (5th Cir. 1986); and C. Itoh, supra note 110.
19°Respecting "on deck" carriage, see Blanchard Lumber, supra note 14. In that case, a
shipment of lumber was carried on deck from Victoria, British Columbia, to Providence, Rhode
Island. The cargo was lost overboard due to the placement of forklift trucks on top of the piles
of lumber for the convenience of stevedores prior to the cargo being lashed and chained.
Subsequently, the ship encountered bad weather, the forklift trucks moved, the chains parted,
and the lumber was lost. The bad weather, however, was expectable for that season and
geographic area. Because of the shipment from a Canadian port, there initially was a conflict of
laws between the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act (and its exculpatory interpretation),
and the Harter Act (applicable to or from ports in the United States). Judge Levet chose to
apply the Harter Act because of "the strong American policy of protection to shippers ... , "
noting that the Harter Act does not exclude deck cargo. The court said: "In the absence of an
affirmative legislative expression to the contrary, however, I see no reason for holding that the
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thing beyond an incorporation by reference is necessary; the bill of
lading must be specifically "tailored" to apply to the period before
and after the ocean voyage' 91 or to the carriage of cargo on deck.192
2. Domestic Waterborne Transport-The Coastwise Option
Since COGSA does not apply to cabotage or domestic trans-
port193-whether internal or coastwise-from one United States port
to another, the courts have had to review the clauses applying
COGSA as contractual provisions rather than provisions mandated
by Congress. This use of COGSA is referred to as the coastwise
option, 194 applying COGSA to domestic transport. While the courts
Harter Act is superseded in all cases by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act as to deck cargo in
the 'tackle to tackle' period." On the effect of the bill of lading language that deck cargo is
"carried only at Merchant's risk," the court found that "a carrier is not permitted to utilize
clauses relieving itself from a duty to properly stow the cargo or to exercise due diligence to
make the vessel seaworthy." Support for the proposition in cases dealing with cargo carried on
deck was found in Compania de Navigacion La Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U.S. 104 (1897); The
Royal Sceptre, 187 F. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); The Ponce, 67 F. Supp. 725, 1946 AMC 1124
(D.N.J. 1946), aftd, 160 F.2d 107, 1947 AMC 685 (3rd Cir. 1947); and Pioneer Import Corp. v.
Lafcomo, 49 F. Supp. 559, 1943 AMC 572 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 138 F.2d 907, 1943 AMC 1349 (2d
Cir. 1943). See also Globe Solvents Co. v. S.S. California, 67 F. Supp. 719, 1946 AMC 674
(E.D. Pa. 1946). Respecting the "before" and "after" periods, see The Monte Iciar, supra note
181 (shipment of sherry wine in casks from Spain to Philadelphia, leaking on pier after
discharge; no stipulation extending COGSA; clause exculpating carrier for leakage, breakage,
or "spigoting" held invalid under the Harter Act). See also California Spray, supra note 187
(shipment of petroleum from the United States to Alexandria, cargo sank while on lighter to
wharf; carrier liable under the Harter Act despite clause that in use of lighters the carrier shall
not be responsible for any loss or damage to goods while on such lighter or in the custody of
lightermen).
19 1 Davis Elliott International Co. v. Pan American Container, 705 F.2d 705 (3rd Cir. 1983),
and Miller Export Corp. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 534 F. Supp. 707, 1982 AMC 1890 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
192In Diethelm & Co. v. S.S. Flying Trader, 141 F. Supp. 271, 1956 AMC 1550 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), a case involving on deck carriage for a voyage from New York to Saigon, the carrier's
clause read as follows: "In respect of goods carried on deck, all risks of loss or damage by perils
inherent in such carriage shall be borne by the shipper or the consignee but in all other respects
the custody and carriage of such goods shall be governed by the terms of this bill of lading and
the provisions stated in said Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, notwithstanding sec. 1(c) thereof
.... (emphasis added)"
19146 U.S.C. Appx. § 1312 (1988) states that "Nothing in this Act shall be held to apply to
contracts for carriage of goods by sea between any port of the United States or its possessions,
and any other port of the United States or its possessions .... "
19446 U.S.C. Appx. § 1312 (1988) (first proviso) ("Provided, however, that any bill of lading
or similar document of title which is evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea
between such ports, containing an express statement that it shall be subject to the provisions of
this chapter, shall be subjected hereto as fully as if subject hereto by the express provisions of
this chapter ...." [The clause paramount then follows]) See also The Agwimoon, 31 F.2d
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favor coastwise option clauses, the statutory language requires that
disputed clauses be measured by the standards of COGSA.195
B. Application of COGSA to the Harter Act Period "ex contractu"
The application of COGSA to Harter Act periods where there is no
corresponding COGSA coverage has brought forth, arguably, a
stricter scrutiny by the courts than in the periods of simultaneous
coverage.196 This scrutiny may involve weighing the clauses by the
precedents evolved under the Harter Actl97 and, in a reverse twist,
has produced the doctrine of non-revivability of COGSA clauses in
the Harter Act period.198
1006, 1929 AMC 570 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 874 (1929), and The Cornelia, 15 F.2d 245,
1926 AMC 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
1gsThe West Kyska, 62 F. Supp. 511, 1945 AMC 1215 (E.D. La. 1945), aftd, 155 F.2d 687,
1946 AMC 997 (5th Cir. 1949) (carriage of steel on deck from Baltimore to Seattle; carrier held
not to have met COGSA burden of proof on peril of the sea). See also Globe Solvents, supra
note 190; Pannell v. S.S. American Flyer, 157 F. Supp. 422, 1958 AMC 1428 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
General Motors Corp. v. S.S. Mormacoak, 327 F. Supp. 666,1971 AMC 1647 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
and Home Insurance Co. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, 524 F. Supp. 541, 1982
AMC 1897 (D.P.R. 1981).
'96See, e.g., Colgate Palmolive Co. v. S.S. Dart Canada, 724 F.2d 313, 1984 AMC 305 (2d
Cir. 1983). In that case, the bill of lading provided that COGSA shall "govern before the goods
are loaded on and after they are discharged from the ship and throughout the entire time the
goods are in custody of the carrier." Although the terminal operator raised in defense the
COGSA $500 per package limit of liability, the court applied New Jersey's strict and unlimited
liability of a bailee warehouseman for conversion. This case is cited with hesitation, however,
because of the intense criticism it has provoked. See also Moonwalk International v. Seatrain
Italy, 1985 AMC 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). (COGSA rejected during contractual COGSA period).
Cf. North River Ins. Co. v. Fed Sea/Fed Pac Line, 647 F.2d 985, 1982 AMC 2963 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982), which holds that the Harter Act continues to apply in
domestic trade but does not apply in international trade when COGSA is displaced. The court
there approved a bill of lading forum selection clause under contractual COGSA in the case of
a shipment of yachts from Hong Kong to Milwaukee and Toronto. The forum and law clause
selected the maritime law of the port of destination and, respecting the Toronto destination,
selected the "Exchequer Court of Canada, Quebec Admiralty District, Montreal Registry."
The precise language of the Ninth Circuit follows:
Because the language of COGSA is not inconsistent with foreign jurisdiction clauses, we
reject the view that COGSA preempts all contract terms when its sole force is by
incorporation into a contract for foreign transportation. When international parties
contractually provide for COGSA to govern disputes, they need not be barred from
determining where they want the disputes to be heard. We hold, therefore, that Bremen
[Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 1972 AMC 1407 (1972)] controls this case, in
which COGSA is incorporated into a contract for foreign carriage, outside of the ex
proprio vigore coverage of either the Harter Act or COGSA."
647 F.2d at 990.
197See supra note 189.
198See David Crystal, supra note 186, where the concept of "non-revivability" of a clause
void under COGSA is introduced because of the justifiable reliance of the shipper. Leather's
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VI.
CONCLUSION
The Harter Act has served its purposes for the past one hundred
years. For the first forty-three years, it served as the brake upon the
creation of exculpatory clauses in bills of lading that would deprive
cargo interests of their legal rights and even impede international
trade by affecting the negotiability of the bill of lading. For the past
fifty-seven years, the Harter Act, in cooperation with COGSA, has
reinforced an equitable allocation of risks even though the conditions
of the shipping industry have changed radically.
The Harter Act changed the shipping business in a positive way.
Restraints on new exculpatory clauses may have had the salutary
effect of imparting more caution to an industry dependent on fore-
sight, but we can never prove this.
Despite the understanding of its drafters, it has not proven to be
chauvinistic in actual practice. Rather, the compromise introduced in
the Harter Act moved into worldwide shipping through its influence
on the Hague Rules, the Visby Amendments, and even the Hamburg
Rules. For seventy of the past one hundred years, maritime transport
has had at least a sharing of risks instead of the previously unbalanced
assignment of all risks to shippers through bill of lading clauses by
carriers with total control of the goods and total knowledge of the
circumstances of damage to the cargo.
The concepts of due diligence and seaworthiness have never been
clearly defined and the defenses of negligent navigation and manage-
ment can only continue to exacerbate the relation between the carrier
interests and the cargo-owning interests. In actuality, these defenses
are not very important and are only retained to demonstrate that
cargo must share the risks common to both interests.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Harter Act ever more
strictly until, seeking perfection, it undermined the statute with
Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 1971 AMC 2383 (2d Cir. 1971), however, is the
leading authority. A container of leather goods in bales was carried from Hamburg to New
York, where the container was unloaded into a terminal area from which it was stolen. The
Hague Rules period having expired, the court was confronted with the issue of the validity
under the Harter Act of a stamped clause with the carrier's interpretation of the COGSA unit
limitation of liability to the effect that carrier liability for loss or damage to the entire container
and its contents was limited to $500. The court had no trouble finding that the clause violated
COGSA, 46 U.S.C. Appx. § 1303(8) (1988), by lessening carrier liability, but failed to reach a
similar conclusion under the Harter Act, relying instead on the doctrine of non-revivability
which brought forth a vigorous dissent from Judge Mulligan on the absence of any basis for the
non-revivability doctrine.
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non-causal unseaworthiness. Accordingly, it is time to replace the
special concepts appropriate to an earlier age and bring maritime
transport in line with road, rail, and air transport.
A misguided effort to codify maritime law in 1985 would have
repealed the Harter Act while at the same time altering the traditional
expressions of the Hague Rules as found in COGSA.199 In that
context, the Harter Act had to be preserved.
Now, with the Hamburg Rules having come into force internation-
ally on November 1, 1992,200 it is time to consider the future of the
Harter Act.
Turning to the Hamburg Rules, we see the period of carrier
responsibility to be similar to Harter, from the taking in charge at the
port of loading until delivery at the port of discharge. 2 1 We see,
however, that the obligation to use due diligence to make the vessel
seaworthy is gone, but in its place is a duty, more closely resembling
the absolute warranty of seaworthiness, 20 2 that requires the carrier to
take all measures to avoid damage to the cargo and its consequenc-
es.203
As the Hamburg Rules have a new time bar,204 a unit limitation
amount acceptable to all parts of the maritime industry, 205 and a
provision making null and void those exculpatory clauses that lessen
carrier liability, 2°6 the time has come to conclude that the Harter Act
has done its work. Accordingly, when the Hamburg Rules replace
COGSA, the Harter Act should be repealed.
'99See H.R. 3157, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. This was a draft prepared by the Law Revision
Counsel of the House of Representatives in conjunction with the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries. The goal was "simplification" of statutory language.
20 Art. 30, Hamburg Rules.
20t Art. 4, Hamburg Rules.202See supra note 63.
203Art. 5, Hamburg Rules ("unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents took all
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences").2
°4Art. 20(1), Hamburg Rules (two years).205Art. 6, Hamburg Rules (2.5 SDR per kilo or 835 SDR per package, whichever is greater).
20 6Aft. 23, Hamburg Rules.
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